THE  TRENT  AFFAIR 


AN    HISTORICAL    RETROSPECT 


BY 


CHARLES   FRANCIS  ADAMS 


"  '  T  is  Fifty  Years  Since. 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

DAVIS 


WITS  COHPLIHENTS  OF 

FRANOI8 


1 


THE  TRENT  AFFAIR 

AN    HISTORICAL    RETROSPECT 


BY 
CHARLES    FRANCIS   ADAMS 


Tis  Fifty  Years  Since.11 


BOSTON 

1912 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSFTY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
DAVIS 


.  [The  following  "paper,  prepared  for  the  Massachusetts  Historical  So 
ciety,  submitted  and  in  part  read  at  its  November  meeting,  1911,  ap 
pears  in  the  printed  Proceedings  of  that  Society,  vol.  XLV.  pp.  35-76. 
A  few  changes  in  language  have  been  made,  and  a  paragraph  added 
in  this  issue.  In  the  Proceedings  it  is  accompanied  (pp.  76-159)  by  letters 
on  the  Trent  Affair,  drawn  from  the  correspondence  of  Charles  Francis 
Adams,  then  Minister  to  Great  Britain,  and  from  other  sources.] 


THE   TRENT    AFFAIR. 


As,  doubtless,  all  of  us  have  had  frequent  occasion  to  observe, 
there  are  few  occurrences  which  in  their  relative  connection 
with  other  occurrences  or  with  things  at  large  do  not  assume 
with  the  lapse  of  time  aspects  strangely  different.  The  passage 
of  fifty  years  is  a  great  dissolvent  and  clarifier.  The  interna 
tional  incident,  still  memorable,  known  as  the  affair  of  the 
Trent  and  the  seizure  by  Captain  Charles  Wilkes,  then  com 
manding  the  San  Jacinto,  of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell,  the  two 
Confederate  envoys,  occurred  on  the  8th  of  November,  and 
the  fiftieth  recurrence  of  that  date  accordingly  came  about 
yesterday. 

One  living  in  those  times  who  had  then  attained  even  a  degree 
of  maturity,  that  is,  any  man  or  woman  now  over  sixty-five 
years  of  age,  cannot  but  retain,  if  American,  a  distinct  recol 
lection  of  the  incident,  and  a  general  memory  at  least  of  the 
excitement  caused  by  it,  and  the  intense  interest  with  which 
every  stage  of  its  development  was  awaited.  For  such,  however, 
it  is  necessary  also  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  present  great  major 
ity,  those  of  the  younger  generations,  do  not  have  this  vivid 
personal  recollection  of  the  events  of  that  memorable  period, 
and  there  are  many  whose  ideas  concerning  the  affair  of  the 
Trent  are  vague  and,  to  say  the  least,  unsettled.  For  instance, 
as  an  illustration  in  point  let  me  relate  an  incident  told  me  by 
my  friend  Mr.  Moorfield  Storey.  Among  the  guests  on  one 
occasion  at  Mr.  Storey's  house  was  an  intelligent  young  fellow, 
either  a  recent  Harvard  graduate  or,  possibly,  in  one  of  the  older 
classes.  He  was  also  in  a  general  way  not  ill  informed,  as  men 
of  that  age  go.  Incidentally  a  reference  was  made  to  the  as 
sault  of  Preston  Brooks  on  Charles  Sumner  in  the  United  States 


Senate  chamber,  —  very  fresh  and  vivid  in  Mr.  Storey's 
recollections.  To  his  utter  surprise  this  young  man  listened 
with  interest,  and  then  asked  for  further  details,  observing 
that  he  knew  nothing  about  it,  never  having  heard  of  the 
occurrence  before!  To  us  who  lived  in  those  times,  such  a 
lack  of  information  upon  really  momentous  historical  events 
seems  incomprehensible,  almost  astounding.  Yet  from  per 
sonal  experience  I  have  reason  to  believe  the  case  was  in  no 
wise  exceptional. 

With  us  of  the  Civil  War  generation  the  events  of  that  period 
are,  on  the  contrary,  in  the  language  of  Milton,  "writ  large." 
They  stand  forth  in  memory,  belittling  where  they  do  not 
altogether  obscure  the  historical  episodes  of  very  considerable 
importance  which  have  since  occupied  attention.  It  is,  there 
fore,  always  peculiarly  interesting  to  us  —  now  lingerers  from 
that  bygone  generation  —  to  look  back  on  those  events  through 
the  perspective  of  fifty  years,  and,  recalling  our  feelings  at  the 
time,  note  the  different  aspects  those  events  now  wear.  Few  are 
more  well  worth  consideration  from  this  point  of  view  than  the 
episode  I  have  referred  to,  —  the  taking  of  the  Confederate 
envoys,  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell,  from  the  steamer  Trent 
on  November  8,  1861. 

In  pursuance  of  my  present  purpose,  I  do  not  propose  to 
enter  into  any  detailed  narrative  of  what  then  occurred.  So 
far  as  the  facts  are  concerned,  the  incident  has  taken  its  place, 
and  presumably  its  proper  place,  in  recorded  history.  The 
field  too  has  been  thoroughly  gleaned;  and,  though  nearly 
twenty  years  have  passed  since  the  publication  of  Mr.  Thomas 
L.  Harris's  very  thorough  monograph  entitled  The  Trent 
Affair,  little  light  of  value  has  in  the  intervening  time  been 
cast  on  the  subject.  The  conclusions  therein  reached  have 
been  revised  in  no  essential  respect.  In  his  Life  of  William  H. 
Seward,  Mr.  Frederic  Bancroft  devotes  to  this  incident  his 
thirty-third  chapter,  and  in  that  gives  a  thoroughly  un 
prejudiced  -and  critical  account  of  what  occurred.  Reading 
it  afresh,  Mr.  Bancroft's  narrative  strikes  me  as  judicial; 
and,  moreover,  so  far  as  Seward  is  concerned,  while  he  in  it 
nothing  extenuates,  he  sets  down  naught  in  malice. 

Before  entering  in  the  casual  way  now  proposed  on  my 
retrospect,  I  must  first  submit  certain  broad  conclusions  in 


regard  to  the  affair,  and  the  influences  and  conditions  under 
which  it  occurred. 

Speaking  generally,  I  think  I  do  not  remember  in  the  whole 
course  of  the  half-century's  retrospect  —  equal  to  the  period 
which  elapsed  between  the  surrender  at  Yorktown  and  the 
presidency  of  Andrew  Jackson  —  any  occurrence  in  which  the 
American  people  were  so  completely  swept  off  their  feet,  for 
the  moment  losing  possession  of  their  senses,  as  during  the 
weeks  which  immediately  followed  the  seizure  of  Mason  and 
Slidell.  Everything  combined  to  this  result.  In  the  first  place, 
when  the  incident  occurred  the  community  was  in  a  wholly  over 
wrought  nervous  condition.  On  the  8th  of  November,  1861 ,  seven 
months  had  elapsed  since  the  firing  on  Fort  Sumter,  and  nearly 
four  months  since  the  mortifying  Bull  Run  experience.  It  was 
exactly  a  year  from  the  election  to  the  presidency  of  Abraham 
Lincoln.  That  election,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  been 
immediately  followed  by  the  initial  movement  of  South  Caro 
lina  in  the  direction  of  secession.  Then  followed  the  trying 
winter  of  1860  and  1861,  during  which  State  after  State  seceded, 
the  war  cloud  in  the  South  ever  gathering,  and  assuming  day 
by  day  a  more  threatening  aspect.  The  five  months  which 
elapsed  between  the  election  of  1860  and  the  firing  on  Fort 
Sumter  were  probably  the  most  trying  period,  psychologically, 
this  country  has  ever  passed  through.  The  inevitable  was 
constantly  assuming  a  more  portentous  shape.  At  last  in 
April  war  broke  out.  Thus  in  November,  1861,  the  country 
had  been  on  tenter-hooks,  so  to  speak,  for  twelve  entire  months, 
and  during  the  last  six  of  those  months  one  mortification  and 
failure  had  followed  sharp  on  another.  The  community,  in  a 
state  of  the  highest  possible  tension,  was  constantly  hoping 
for  a  successful  coup  somewhere  and  by  someone  executed  in 
its  behalf.  It  longed  for  a  man  who  would  do,  taking  the 
responsibility  of  the  doing.  While  it  was  in  this  state  of 
mind,  the  telegraph  one  day  announced  that  the  United  States 
sloop  of  war  San  Jacinto,  under  the  command  of  Captain  Wilkes, 
had  arrived  at  Fortress  Monroe,  having  on  board  the  two  Con 
federate  envoys,  Mason  and.  Slidell,  taken  on  the  high  seas 
from  the  British  mail  steamer  Trent.  At  last  the  hour  seemed 
come,  and  with  it  a  man.  By  one  now  seeking  an  explanation 
of  what  then  occurred,  all  this  must  be  borne  in  mind. 


Thus  worked  up  to  the  highest  pitch  of  excitement,  the 
feeling  of  the  country  had  also  been  slowly  fermenting  to  one 
of  acute  hostility  towards  Great  Britain;  and  this  for  two  rea 
sons.  In  the  first  place,  it  had  seemed  as  if,  in  view  of  its  anti- 
slavery  preachings  during  the  last  thirty  years,  and  its  some 
what  Pharisaic,  better-than-thou  attitude  towards  America 
as  respects  the  negro  and  his  condition,  Great  Britain  had  failed 
to  evince  that  sympathy  towards  us  which  was  expected  be 
cause  of  the  Slaveholders'  rebellion,  and  had,  to  say  the  least, 
done  nothing  to  forward  the  cause  of  the  Union  in  a  crisis 
brought  on  by  the  aggressive  action  of  the  South.  On  the  con 
trary,  the  attitude  of  England  in  general  had  been  sneering  as 
well  as  adversely  critical;  and  the  tone  of  the  London  Times, 
in  particular,  —  for  the  Times,  still  known  as  "The  Thunderer," 
was  recognized  as  the  first  and  most  influential  newspaper  in 
the  world,  —  had  been  distinctly  unsympathetic,  not  to  say 
antagonistic  and  otherwise  acutely  irritating.  William  H. 
Russell,  the  famous  Crimean  War  correspondent,  was  also 
at  that  time  in  this  country,  and  his  letters  regularly  appearing 
in  the  Times  as  "from  our  special  correspondent"  were  repub- 
lished  and  read  in  America  to  an  extent  which  can  hardly 
now  be  understood.  Anxiously  waited  for,  and  printed  in 
extenso  in  all  the  leading  journals,  extracts  from  them  were 
to  be  found  in  every  paper  in  the  land.  Russell  had  been  to 
a  certain  extent  present  at  Bull  Run,  and  a  witness  of  our  dis 
grace.  While  his  account  of  what  he  saw  on  that  occasion 
was  photographic  and  strictly  correct,  we  none  the  less  had 
become  morbidly  conscious  that  there  was  "a  chiel  amang  [us] 
taking  notes,"  and  the  "notes"  he  took  when  seen  in  "prent" 
caused  a  degree  of  irritation  at  this  day  difficult  to  describe 
or  overstate.  Thus  morbidly  excited  and  intensely  sensitive, 
the  ^country  was  in  a  thoroughly  unreasoning  and  altogether 
unreasonable  condition,  very  necessary  now  to  emphasize;  for 
it  needed  only  the  occurrence  of  some  accident  to  lead  to  a 
pronounced  explosion  of  what  can  only  be  described  as  Anglo 
phobia.  Discouraged,  we  had  in  fact  only  begun  to  settle 
down  to  the  conviction  that  a  long  and  uncertain  struggle  was 
before  us.  With  all  conditions,  therefore,  explosive,  so  to 
speak,  in  character,  the  incident  of  the  Trent  came  like  a  bolt 
from  a  clouded  and  lowering  sky;  but  it  was  a  shell  exploding 


in  a  powder  magazine  rather  than  a  spark  falling  in  a  mass  of 
combustible  matter. 

The  course  of  events,  briefly  stated,  was  as  follows :  —  Imme 
diately  after  the  firing  upon  Fort  Sumter,  Jefferson  Davis, 
President  of  the  then  newly  organized  Confederate  States,  had 
sent  out  to  Europe  agents  to  forward  the  interests  of  the  pro 
posed  nationality.  These  agents  had  there  spent  some  seven 
months,  accomplishing  little.  Disappointed  at  their  failure, 
Davis  determined  upon  a  second  and  more  formal  mission .  The 
new  representatives  were  designated  as  "Special  Commissioners 
of  the  Confederate  States  of  America,  near  the  Government" 
whether  of  Great  Britain  or  of  France,  as  the  case  might  be. 
James  Murray  Mason  of  Virginia  and  John  Slidell  of  Louisiana 
were  selected,  the  first  named  for  London,  the  second  for  Paris. 
Both,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  recently  been  Senators  of  the 
United  States,  Slidell  having  withdrawn  from  the  Senate  Febru 
ary  4,  1 86 1,  immediately  after  the  passage  of  the  Ordinance  of 
Secession  by  the  State  of  Louisiana;  while  Mason,  having 
absented  himself  about  March  20,  during  the  session  of  the 
Senate  for  executive  business,  did  not  again  take  his  seat. 
Virginia  seceded  April  17,  and  Mason,  together  with  several 
other  Southern  Senators,  was  in  his  absence  expelled  by  formal 
vote  (July  u)  at  the  special  session  of  the  Thirty-Seventh 
Congress,  which  met  under  the  call  of  President  Lincoln, 
July  4,  1 86 1.  Probably  no  two  men  in  the  entire  South  were 
more  thoroughly  obnoxious  to  those  of  the  Union  side  than 
Mason  and  Slidell.  The  first  was,  in  many  and  by  no  means 
the  best  ways,  a  typical  Virginian.  Very  provincial  and  in 
tensely  arrogant,  his  dislike  of  New  England,  and  especially  of 
Massachusetts,  was  pronounced,  and  exceeded  only  by  his 
contempt.1  It  was  said  of  him  at  the  time  that  when  trouble 

1  The  course  of  subsequent  events  in  no  way  mollified  these  antipathies. 
Writing  from  London  to  a  daughter  in  Virginia  thirteen  months  (April  5,  1866) 
after  the  delivery  of  Lincoln's  second  inaugural,  he  thus  expressed  himself:  — 
"In  my  varied  intercourse  with  the  world,  I  have  met  with  some  whom  I  held  in 
disesteem,  with  others  in  contempt,  as  unworthy,  and  some  few  who  were  essen 
tially  bad;  but,  in  looking  back,  I  do  not  recognize  that  my  feelings  toward  any 
such  amounted  to  acrimony,  or  insuperable  hate.  Now  it  is  otherwise.  I  confess, 
that  toward  every  man  or  thing  North,  there  has  arisen  within  me  a  feeling  of 
detestation  that  I  cannot  express  or  qualify,  if  I  would.  In  the  war  they  waged 
against  us,  they  were  demons  —  in  victory,  they  proved  themselves  fiends.  There 
are,  of  course,  individual  exceptions  I  doubt  not,  but  I  have  yet  to  learn  of  one 


8 

was  brewing  and  he  was  invited  to  make  a  speech  in  Boston, 
he.  had  replied  that  he  would  not  again  visit  Massachusetts 
until  he  went  there  as  an  ambassador.  Slidell,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  considered  one  of  the  most  astute  and  dangerous 
of  all  Confederate  public  characters.  An  intriguer  by  nature, 
unscrupulous  in  his  political  methods,  he  was  credited  with 
having  fraudulently  defeated,  by  secret  manipulations,  the 
Clay  ticket  in  Louisiana  in  the  1844  presidential  election, 
and  was  generally  looked  upon  as  the  most  dangerous  person  to 
the  Union  the  Confederacy  could  select  for  diplomatic  work 
in  Europe.1  The  first  object  of  the  envoys  was  to  secure  the 
recognition  of  the  Confederacy.  The  ports  of  the  Confederate 
States  were  then  blockaded;  but  the  blockade  had  not  yet 
become  really  effective.  The  new  envoys  selected  Charleston 
as  their  port  of  embarkation,  and  October  12  as  its  date. 
The  night  of  the  i2th  was  dark  and  rainy,  but  with  little 
or  no  wind,  conditions  altogether  favorable  for  their  purpose. 
They  left  Charleston  on  the  little  Confederate  steamer  Theo 
dora,  evaded  the  blockading  squadron,  and  reached  New 
Providence,  Nassau,  two  days  later,  the  i4th.  It  had  been 
the  intention  of  the  envoys  to  take  passage  for  Europe  at 
Nassau  on  an  English  steamer;  but,  failing  to  find  one  which 
did  not  stop  at  New  York,  the  Theodora  continued  her  voyage 
to  Cardenas  in  Cuba,  whence  the  envoys  and  those  accom 
panying  them  proceeded  overland  to  Havana.  Arriving  at 
Havana  about  the  22d  of  October,  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell 
remained  there  until  the  yth  of  November.  They  then  em- 
prominent  man  there  who  has,  since  the  rupture,  expressed  a  sentiment,  or  evinced 
a  feeling,  that  would  not  be  held  a  disgrace  to  manhood  elsewhere."  The  Public 
Life  and  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  James  M.  Mason,  581. 

1  W.  H.  Russell  thus  wrote  of  Mr.  Slidell  in  a  letter  to  the  Times,  which  ap 
peared  in  its  issue  of  December  10, 1861 :  —  "Mr.  Slidell,  whom  I  had  the  pleasure 
of  meeting  in  New  Orleans,  is  a  man  of  more  tact  and  he  is  not  inferior  to  his 
colleague  Mr.  Mason  in  other  respects.  He  far  excels  him  in  subtlety  and  depth, 
and  is  one  of  the  most  consummate  masters  of  political  manoeuvre  in  the  States. 
He  is  what  is  here  called  a  '  wire-puller '  —  a  man  who  unseen  moves  the  puppets 
on  the  public  stage  as  he  lists  —  a  man  of  iron  will  and  strong  passions,  who 
loves  the  excitement  of  combinations,  .  .  .  and  who  in  his  dungeon  [at  Fort 
Warren],  or  whatever  else  it  may  be,  would  conspire  with  the  mice  against  the  cat 
sooner  than  not  conspire  at  all.  .  .  .  Originally  a  northern  man,  he  has  thrown 
himself  into  the  southern  cause  and  staked  his  great  fortune  on  the  issue  without 
hesitation,  and  with  all  the  force  of  his  intellect  and  character.  And  even  he  be 
lieved  that  England  must  break  the  blockade  for  cotton." 


barked  on  the  British  steamer  Trent,  the  captain  of  the  Trent 
having  full  knowledge  of  their  diplomatic  capacity  as  envoys 
r  of  an  insurgent  community,  and  giving  consent  to  their  embarka 
tion.  The  Trent  was  a  British  mail  packet,  making  regular 
trips  between  Vera  Cruz,  in  the  Republic  of  Mexico,  and  the 
Danish  Island  of  St.  Thomas.  She  was  in  no  respect  a  blockade 
runner;  was  not  engaged  in  commerce  with  any  American  port; 
and  was  then  on  a  regular  voyage  from  a  port  in  Mexico,  by 
way  of  Havana,  to  her  advertised  destination,  St.  Thomas, 
all  neutral  ports.  At  St.  Thomas  direct  connection  could  be 
made  with  a  line  of  British  steamers  running  to  Southampton. 
The  envoys,  therefore,  when  they  left  Havana,  were  on  a  neutral 
mail  steamer,  sailing  under  the  British  flag,  on  a  schedule  voyage 
between  neutral  points. 

At  just  that  time  the  United  States  war  steamer,  San  Jacinto, 
a  first-class  screw  sloop  mounting  fifteen  guns,  was  returning 
from  a  cruise  on  the  western  coast  of  Africa,  where  for  twenty 
months  she  had  been  part  of  the  African  squadron  engaged  in 
suppressing  the  slave  trade.  She  was  commanded  by  Captain 
Wilkes,  who  had  recently  joined  her.  Returning  by  way  of  the 
Cape  Verde  Islands,  Captain  Wilkes  there  learned  from  the 
newspapers  about  the  last  of  September  of  the  course  of  public 
events  in  the  United  States,  and  rumors  reached  him  of 
Confederate  privateers,  as  they  were  then  called,  destroying 
American  vessels  in  West  India  waters.  He  determined  to 
make  an  effort  at  the  capture  of  some  of  these  "  privateers." 
On  October  loth  the  San  Jacinto  reached  the  port  of  St. 
Thomas,  and  subsequently  touched  at  Cienfuegos  on  the  south 
coast  of  Cuba.  There  Captain  Wilkes  learned,  also  from 
the  newspapers,  that  the  Confederate  envoys  were  at  that 
very  time  at  Havana,  and  about  to  take  passage  for  Southamp 
ton.  Reaching  Havana  on  the  28th  of  October,  the  commander 
of  the  San  Jacinto  further  learned  that  the  commissioners  were 
to  embark  on  the  steamer  Trent,  scheduled  to  leave  Havana 
on  the  7th  of  November.  Captain  Wilkes  then  conceived  the 
design  of  intercepting  the  Trent,  exercising  the  right  of  search, 
and  making  prisoners  of  the  envoys.  No  question  as  to  his 
right  to  stop,  board,  and  search  the  Trent  seems  to  have  entered 
the  mind  of  Captain  Wilkes.  He  did,  however,  take  into  his 
confidence  his  executive  officer,  Lieutenant  Fairfax,  disclosing 


10 

to  him  his  project.  Lieutenant  Fairfax  entered,  it  is  said,  a 
vigorous  protest  against  the  proposed  action,  and  strongly 
urged  on  Captain  Wilkes  the  necessity  of  proceeding  with  great 
caution  unless  he  wished  to  provoke  international  difficulties, 
and  not  impossibly  a  war  with  Great  Britain.  He  then  suggested 
that  his  commanding  officer  consult  an  American  Judge  at 
Key  West,  an  authority  on  maritime  law;  which,  however, 
Captain  Wilkes  declined  to  do.  Leaving  Key  West  on  the 
morning  of  November  5th,  Captain  Wilkes  directed  the  course 
of  the  San  Jacinto  to  what  is  known  as  the  Bahama  Channel, 
through  which  the  Trent  would  necessarily  pass  on  its  way  to 
St.  Thomas,  and  there  stationed  himself.  About  noon  on  the 
8th  of  November,  the  Trent  hove  in  sight,  and  when  she  had 
approached  sufficiently  near  the  San  Jacinto,  a  round  shot 
was  fired  athwart  her  course;  the  United  States  flag  was  run  up 
at  the  mast  head  at  the  same  time.  The  approaching  vessel 
showed  the  English  colors,  but  did  not  check  her  speed  or 
indicate  a  disposition  to  heave  to.  Accordingly,  a  few  instants 
later,  a  shell  from  the  San  Jacinto  was  exploded  across  her  bows. 
This  had  the  desired  effect.  The  Trent  immediately  stopped, 
and  a  boat  from  the  San  Jacinto  proceeded  to  board  her.  It 
is  unnecessary  to  go  into  the  details  of  what  then  occurred.  For 
present  purposes  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  the  two  envoys, 
together  with  their  secretaries,  were  identified  and  forcibly 
removed,  being  taken  on  board  the  San  Jacinto;  which,  with 
out  interfering  with  the  mails  or  otherwise  subjecting  the 
Trent  to  search,  then  laid  its  course  for  Fortress  Monroe. 
Arriving  there  on  the  i5th,  news  of  the  capture  was  imme 
diately  flashed  over  the  country.  The  Trent,  on  the  other  hand, 
proceeded  to  St.  Thomas,  where  her  passengers  were  trans 
ferred  to  another  steamer,  and  completed  the  voyage  to  South 
ampton.  They  arrived  and  the  report  of  the  transaction  was 
made  public  in  Great  Britain  November  27th,  twelve  days 
after  the  arrival  of  the  San  Jacinto  at  Fortress  Monroe,  and  the 
publication  of  the  news  of  the  arrest  in  the  United  States. 

Such  were  the  essential  facts  in  the  case,  and,  while  a  storm 
of  enthusiastic  approval  was  sweeping  over  the  northern  part 
of  the  United  States  in  the  twelve  days  between  November 
1 5th  and  November  27th,  a  storm  of  indignation  of  quite  equal 
intensity  swept  over  Great  Britain  between  November  27th 


1 1 

and  the  close  of  the  year.1  Most  fortunately  there  was  no  ocean 
cable  in  those  days,  and  the  movement  of  the  Atlantic  steamers 
was  comparatively  slow.  Accordingly  the  first  intimations  of 
the  commotion  caused  in  Great  Britain  by  the  action  of  Captain 
Wilkes  did  not  reach  America  until  the  arrival  of  the  Hansa 
at  New  York,  December  12.  Strange  as  it  now  seems,  there 
fore,  almost  an  entire  month  had  elapsed  between  the  arrival 
of  the  San  Jacinto  at  Fortress  Monroe  (November  1 5)  and  the 
receipt  in  America  (December  12)  of  any  information  as  to 
the  effect  of  the  seizure  of  the  envoys  on  the  British  temper. 
A  most  important  fact  to  be  now  borne  in  mind. 

In  reading  the  accounts  of  what  occurred  in  America  between 
November  15  and  December  26,  and  seeing  the  recorded  utter 
ances  of  persons  whose  names  carried  authority,  it  is  now  most 
curious  to  observe  the  confusion  of  idea  which  seemed  to  exist 
as  to  the  principles  of  international  law  involved,  and  the  ap 
parent  utter  inability  of  all  concerned  to  exercise  their  reason 
to  the  extent  of  preserving  consistency  of  thought  or  action. 
The  affair  was  looked  at  from  diverse  and  several  points  of  view ; 
and  the  point  of  view  implied  a  great  deal.  The  situation  re 
minds  one,  in  fact,  of  Browning's  poem  of  "The  Ring  and  the 
Book,"  where,  it  will  be  remembered,  the  poet  approaches 
the  mystery  from  the  point  of  view  of  each  participant  in  it, 

—  whether  the  woman  who  was  murdered,  the  husband  who 
murdered  her,  the  counsel  of  the  one  and  of  the  other,  the 
gossip  of  one  half  of  Rome  and  the  other  half  of  Rome,  and 
finally  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Pope.     So,  to  understand 
what  was  then  said  and  done,  the  status  and  capture  of  the 
Confederate  envoys  has  to  be  looked  at  from  the  Confederate 
point  of  view,  from  the  Union  point  of  view,  from  the  English 

1  Two  exceptionally  well-informed  Americans,  long  resident  in  Great  Britain, 
then  wrote,  the  one  from  London  to  Mr.  Seward,  and  the  other  from  Edinburgh 
to  his  uncle,  a  citizen  of  New  York:  —  "There  never  was  within  memory  such  a 
burst  of  feeling  as  has  been  created  by  the  news  of  the  boarding  of  the  [Trent]. 
The  people  are  frantic  with  rage,  and  were  the  country  polled,  I  fear  that  999  men 
out  of  a  thousand  would  declare  for  immediate  war.  Lord  Palmerston  cannot 
resist  the  impulse  if  he  would; "  the  other,  under  the  same  date,  November  29:  — 
"The  excitement  consequent  upon  the  insult  to  the  British  flag  by  the  U.  S. 
Frigate,  San  Jacinto,  has  entirely  monopolized  the  public  mind.  I  have  never 
seen  so  intense  a  feeling  of  indignation  exhibited  in  my  life.  It  pervades  all 
classes,  and  may  make  itself  heard  above  the  wiser  theories  of  the  Cabinet  officers." 

—  War  Records,  Series  II.  n.  1107,  1131. 


12 

point  of  view,  and,  primarily,  from  the  Captain  Charles  Wilkes 
point  of  view.  Seen  through  the  perspective  of  fifty  years,  it 
may  now  with  reasonable  assurance  be  asserted  that,  in  the 
controversy  which  ensued,  the  United  States  did  not  have,  and 
never  had,  in  reality,  a  justifying  leg  to  stand  upon,  and  least 
of  all  was  there  any  possible  justification  for  the  course  pursued 
by  Captain  Wilkes.  In  the  first  place,  Wilkes,  commanding  a 
United  States  ship  of  war,  had  not  been  in  communication  with 
his  government  for  months.  He  had  received  no  instructions; 
he  was  not  even  officially  advised  of  the  existence  of  a  blockade; 
and  only  through  the  newspapers  and  current  gossip  did  he 
know  of  the  attitude  his  own  government  had  assumed  towards 
the  so-called  Confederacy.  According  to  his  own  statement 
subsequently  made,  he  did  have  some  treatises  on  interna 
tional  law  in  the  cabin  of  the  San  Jacinto,  and  he  consulted 
them.1  From  these  he  satisfied  himself  that  accredited  en 
voys  were  "  contraband ";  but  he  ignored  the  fact  that  the 
Confederacy  had  not  been  recognized  by  the  United  States 
Government,  or  by  any  foreign  government,  and  that  the 
so-called  "envoys"  were  merely  "private  gentlemen  of  dis 
tinction,"  citizens  of  certain  States  then  in  insurgency,  trying 
to  effect  a  transit  to  foreign  countries.  They  were  unques 
tionably  embarked  under  a  neutral  flag,  upon  a  mail  steamer 
making  its  regular  passage  from  one  neutral  port  to  another. 
Nevertheless,  pro  hac  vice.  Captain  Wilkes  invested  the  en 
voys  in  question  with  an  official  character  which  his  govern 
ment  distinctly  refused  to  allow  them,  and  then  proceeded 
on  the  assumption  that  ambassadors  were  "embodied  des 
patches,"  to  exercise  on  the  high  seas  a  right  of  search  of 
a  most  questionable  character;  and,  in  so  doing,  he  further 
constituted  himself,  in  the  person  of  his  subordinate,  a  Prize 
Court,  adjudicating  on  the  deck  of  a  neutral  ship  forcibly 
halted  in  its  passage  as  to  what  personages  should  be  seized, 

1  "When  I  heard  at  Cienfuegos  on  the  south  side  of  Cuba  of  these  commis 
sioners  having  landed  on  the  Island  of  Cuba  and  that  they  were  at  the  Havana 
and  would  depart  in  the  English  steamer  on  the  yth  of  November,  I  determined 
to  intercept  them  and  carefully  examined  all  the  authorities  on  international 
law  to  which  I  had  access,  viz.,  Kent,  Wheaton  and  Vattel,  besides  various  de 
cisions  of  Sir  William  Scott  and  other  judges  of  the  admiralty  court  of  Great 
Britain  which  bore  upon  the  rights  of  neutrals  and  their  responsibilities."  Official 
report  of  Captain  Wilkes  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  War  Records,  Series  II. 
n.  1098. 


13 

what  persons  and  property  should  be  exempted  from  seiz 
ure,  as  to  how  far  the  process  of  search  should  be  carried, 
and  generally  what  course  under  the  conditions  given  should 
be  pursued.  Accordingly,  while  forcible  possession  was  taken 
of  the  persons  of  the  two  envoys,  no  inquiry  whatever  was 
made  as  to  their  despatch  bags,  which,  when  the  purpose  of 
the  procedure  was  suspected,  had  been  handed  over  by  the 
Commissioners  to  the  British  mail  agent,  and  been  by  him 
deposited  in  his  mail-room.  They  were  subsequently  in 
due  course  delivered  to  the  agents  of  the  Confederacy  in 
England. 

Incidentally  it  may  here  be  observed  that  this  proceeding 
on  the  part  of  Commander  Williams,  the  mail  agent  in  ques 
tion,  was  in  plain  violation  both  of  recognized  British  principles 
and  precedents  regulating  the  obligations  of  neutrals  as  also  of 
the  Queen's  proclamation  of  the  previous  May;  for  that  ordi 
nance  specifically  warned  all  British  subjects  against  "carrying 
officers,  soldiers,  despatches  ...  for  the  use  or  service  of 
either  of  the  said  contending  parties."  An  English  publicist 
of  recognized  authority  was,  moreover,  at  that  very  time  pro 
nouncing  the  conveyance  of  despatches  a  "service"  of  the 
"most  noxious  and  hostile  character."  Clearly,  then,  Com 
mander  Williams  by  the  acceptance  of  these  despatches,  know 
ing  them  to  be  such,  from  a  recognized  envoy  of  one  of  the 
belligerents,  gravely  compromised  the  steamer  Trent  as  well  as 
himself.  On  this  point  there  was  no  room  for  doubt;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  every  Cunard  steamer  which  crossed  the  Atlan 
tic  —  and  no  others  crossed  it  then  —  carried  despatches  from 
the  other  belligerent,  officially  received  and  delivered  as  such, 
and  this  not  between  neutral  ports,  but  between  New  York  or 
Boston  and  Liverpool.  Indeed,  if  the  carrying  of  despatches 
and  envoys  had  been  disallowed,  in  strict  accordance  with  the 
letter  of  the  proclamation  of  May,  it  would  have  been  neces 
sary  at  that  time  for  the  United  States  Government  to  have 
installed  an  armed  ocean  mail  and  passenger  service  of  its  own. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that,  as  the  British  authorities  laid  the  law 
down,  and  Captain  Wilkes  put  it  in  practical  operation,  the 
ocean  situation  was  mixed.  Or,  as  an  American  publicist  writ 
ing  at  the  time,  but  without  the  slightest  sense  of  suppressed 
humor,  observed,  "it  must  be  admitted  that  the  subject  is  an 


14 

embarrassing  one."  1  In  point  of  fact  it  was  a  farrago  of  ab 
surdities,  contradictions  and  incongruities,  over  which  learned 
men  pondered  and  young  girls  prattled,2  with  results  about 
equally  satisfactory.3 

Recurring  from  this  digression  to  what  occurred  November 
8th  in  the  Bahama  Channel,  the  officer  deputed  for  the  work 
by  Captain  Wilkes,  acting  under  his  instruction,  thus,  it  ap 
peared,  arrested  and  seized  only  the  "embodied  despatches";  the 
despatches  themselves  were,  it  would  seem,  not  made  matter 
even  of  inquiry.  As  to  this  theory  of  "embodied  despatches" 
in  the  persons  of  "private  gentlemen  of  distinction,"  known 
by  general  fame  to  be  the  agents  of  certain  States  in  insurrec 
tion  and  an  admitted  "belligerent"  but  not  as  yet  a  recognized 
nationality,  that  was  a  figment  of  international  law  for  which 
no  precedent  could  be  found  in  the  treatises,  devised  pro  hac 
vice  by  Captain  Charles  Wilkes,  U.  S.  N. 

Dismissing  for  the  moment  the  extraordinary  international 
law  propositions  involved,  and  recurring  to  the  Wilkes  point 

1  Dana,  Wheaton,  659  n. 

2  Rhodes,  History,  in.  522  n. 

3  The  quite  unintelligible  and  somewhat  ludicrous  state  of  what  is  termed 
Law,  of  the  International  variety,  so  far  as  the  topic  here  in  question  is  concerned, 
is  presented  in  a  concrete  shape  in  Moore's  Digest,  vn.  768-779.    The  authorities 
are  there  cited,  and  the  discussions  of  the  Trent  precedent  referred  to.    The  diffi 
culty  seems  to  arise  from  the  attempt  seriously  made  to  apply  the  principles  laid 
down  by  Vattel,  etc.,  and  the  precedents  established  by  Lord  Stowell  to  present 
conditions.    The  existence  of  modern  lines  of  common-carrier  transportation  of 
passengers,  merchandise  and  mails  under  neutral  flags  between  points  not  actu 
ally  blockaded  —  lines  like  the  Peninsula  and  Oriental,  the  Cunard  and  the 
White  Star  —  seems  not  to  have  occurred  to  the  publicists;    while  in  fact  the 
applying  to  the  ships  of  such  lines  the  rules  under  which  Captain  Wilkes  thought 
he  proceeded,  and  the  application  of  which  Mr.  Seward  afterwards  gravely  dis 
cussed,  is  hardly  less  opposed  to  reason  and  common  sense  than  would  be  the  atti 
tude  and  efforts  of  a  tailor  who  endeavored  to  adjust  the  dress  of  a  seven-year- 
old  boy  to  the  body  and  limbs  of  the  same  boy  when  grown  to  be  a  man  of  un 
precedented  size.    In  each  case  the  attempt  is,  or  would  be,  unfortunate,  and 
lead  inevitably  to  results  unexpected  if  not  impossible.    This  apparently  is  the 
one  real  lesson  the  world  derived  from  the  Trent  affair.    It  seems  to  be  ques 
tionable,  however,  whether  either  the  statesmen  at  the  time  took  in  the  fact  or 
the  publicists  since  have  realized  it,  and  the  consequent  utter  futility  of  what  they 
attempted.     Let  the  investigator  substitute  Lusitania  for  Trent,  and  consider 
what  would  necessarily  result.    To-day,  the  procedure  of  Captain  Wilkes  would, 
if  of  possible  occurrence,  be  justly  looked  upon  as  showing  prima  facie  evidence 
of  insanity  in  the  case  of  a  naval  officer  responsible  for  it.    Its  single  possible 
justification  by  his  government  would  be  found  in  Juvenal : 

Hoc  volo,  sic  jubeo,  sit  pro  ratione  voluntas. 


of  view,  it  is  obvious  that  today  any'  such  action  as  that  then 
taken  by  him  would  on  the  part  of  a  naval  officer  be  simply 
inconceivable.     A  similar  hypothetical  case  needs  only  to  be 
suggested  in  connection  with  the  hostilities  now  going  on  in 
the  Mediterranean  between  the  Kingdom  of  Italy  and  the 
Ottoman  Empire.    Such  a  thing  as  a  United  States  mail  steamer 
running  between  New  York,   Gibraltar  and  Alexandria  may 
not  now  exist,  but  it  is  supposable;   and  in  such  case  the  flag 
would   certainly  be  found   to   signify  something  as  respects 
personages  as  well  as  mail-bags.    The  celebrated  Koszta  case 
of  more  than  half  a  century  ago,  though  not  a  precedent  strictly 
in  point,  would  be  revived  in  memory,  and  the  spirit  therein 
displayed  again  invoked.    The  conduct  of  a  commander  of  a 
United  States  armed  ship  of  superior  force  who,  chancing  to 
be  in  those  waters,  at  once  intervened,  and  forcibly  "rescued" 
both  mail-bags  and  persons  from  those  who  had  thus  exercised 
an  alleged  right  of  search  and  seizure,  would  be  promptly 
approved  and  sustained.     But,  under  the  conditions  I  have 
referred  to  as  prevailing  in  this  country  in  the  autumn  and 
early  winter  of  1861,  Captain  Wilkes'  conduct  was   officially 
approved  by  certain  of  those  in  authority,  especially  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  by  the  United  States  House  of 
Representatives.     It  was  even  contended  by  high  authorities 
that  his  acts  were  in  substantial  accordance  with  well-estab 
lished   principles  of   international  law,   to   which,   of  course, 
when  our  turn  came,  we  would  yield  a  cheerful  and  graceful 
acquiescence.     In   other    words,    just    fifty   years   later,    the 
contentions  and  war  of  1812  were  on  our  part  all  a  mistake; 
the  British  attitude  at  that  time  was  correct;  and  the  right 
of  search,  arrest  and  impressment  were  at  last  by  us  fully 
conceded ! 

Such  was  the  logical  aspect  of  the  matter  from  the  Wilkes 
point  of  view.  Next  perhaps  to  be  considered  in  this  cool 
semi-centennial  perspective  light  are  the  popular,  the  official 
and  the  juristic  points  of  view  then  assumed.  So  doing  really 
now  makes  one  who  then  lived  and  actively  participated  feel 
a  little  foolish;  there  is,  however,  a  discipline,  and  even  lesson 
perhaps,  in  a  remorseless  retrospect. 

Personally,  I  have  a  vivid  recollection  of  the  day  when  the 
news  of  the  seizure  was  flashed  to  Boston,  and  hurriedly  plac- 


i6 

arded  on  the  newspaper  bulletin  boards.1  A  youthful  legal 
practitioner,  I  was  then  a  man  of  twenty-six.  I  had  studied, 
or  made  an  at  least  honest  pretence  of  so  doing,  in  the  office 
of  Richard  H.  Dana,  Jr.  Mr.  Dana  was  deemed  as  high  an 
authority  on  maritime  law  as  there  was  at  the  American  bar. 
Reading  the  announcement  on  the  bulletin  board,  I  hurried 
up  to  his  office,  and  communicated  the  startling  news.  Well 
do  I  remember  his  reception  of  it.  His  face  lighted  up,  and, 
clapping  his  hands  with  satisfaction  over  the  tidings,  he  ex 
pressed  his  emphatic  approval  of  the  act,  adding  that  he  would 
risk  his  " professional  reputation"  on  its  legality..  And  this 
was  the  view  universally  expressed  and  generally  accepted. 

The  San  Jacinto,  having  put  into  Fortress  Monroe  on  the 
1 5th  of  November,  was,  for  various  reasons,  ordered  to  pro 
ceed  at  once  to  New  York,  and  thence  to  Boston;  there  to 
deliver  its  prisoners  for  safe  keeping.  Captain  Wilkes  anchored 
his  ship  in  Boston  harbor  on  the  24th  of  November,  and  two 
days  later  a  dinner  was  given  him  and  his  officers  at  the  Revere 
House,  the  Hon.  J.  Wiley  Edmands  presiding.  Mr.  Edmands, 
prominent  among  the  solid  business  men  of  Boston  of  that 
period,  lived  at  Newton  and  was  treasurer  of  the  Pacific  Mills; 
a  Webster  Whig  in  politics,  he  had  been  a  member  of  the  Thirty- 
third  Congress.  The  speakers  on  this  occasion  seemed  to 
vie  with  each  other  in  establishing  a  record  from  which  there 
after  it  would  be  impossible  to  escape.  For  instance,  John  A. 
Andrew,  then  Governor  of  Massachusetts,  a  man  really  great 
but  of  somewhat  impulsive  disposition,  had  been  present  in 
the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  when  the  news  of  the 
seizure  came  in.  Literally  swept  off  his  feet,  he  had  then 
sprung  upon  a  chair  and  been  prominent. in  the  tumult  of 
cheering  which  followed  the  announcement.  He  now  at  this 
public  dinner2  declared  that  Captain  Wilkes  had  shown  "not 
only  wise  judgment,  but  [his  act  was  marked  by]  manly  and 
heroic  success."  He  referred  to  it  as  "one  of  the  most 


1  Saturday,  November  16.    On  the  afternoon  of  that  day  the  following  de 
spatch  was  sent  from  Washington:  "The  intelligence  of  the  capture  of  Slidell 
and  Mason  has  diffused  the  greatest  possible  joy  among  all  the  citizens,  including 
the  Government  officials  from  the  President  down  to  the  humblest  messenger." 

2  An  account  of  the  affair  will  be  found  in  the  Boston  Evening  Transcript, 
November  27,  1861. 


illustrious  services  that  had  made  the  war  memorable";  and 
then  most  unnecessarily  capped  the  climax  of  indiscretion  by 
informing  a  delighted  audience  "that  there  might  be  noth 
ing  left  [in  the  episode  to]  crown  the  exultation  of  the  Ameri 
can  heart,  Commodore  Wilkes  fired  his  shot  across  the  bows  of 
the  ship  that  bore  the  British  Lion  at  its  head."  On  the  same 
occasion  George  T.  Bigelow,  then  Chief  Justice  of  Massachu 
setts,  committed  himself  to  an  almost  though  not  quite  similar 
extent.  First  he  voiced  the  very  prevalent  feeling  already 
referred  to,  saying:  —  "In  common  with  all  loyal  men  of  the 
North,  I  have  been  sighing,  for  the  last  six  months,  for  some 
one  who  would  be  willing  to  say  to  himself,  'I  will  take  the 
responsibility';  and  who  would  not  only  say  this,  but  when 
the  opportunity  offered  would  take  the  responsibility."  The 
Chief  Justice  of  our  Supreme  Court  then  went  on  to  de 
clare  that  "Commodore  Wilkes  acted  more  from  the  noble 
instincts  of  his  patriotic  heart,  than  from  any  sentence  he 
read  from  a  law  book";  adding  .that,  under  such  circum 
stances,  "a  man  does  not  want  to  ask  counsel,  or j  to  con 
sult  judges  upon  his  duty;  his  heart,  rhis  instinct,  tells  him 
what  he  ought  to  do."  Well  might  the  London  Times  in  com 
menting  on  the  affair  observe  shortly  after  —  "These  are  wild 
words  from  lawyers."  Captain  Wilkes  then,  in  language 
indicative  of  singular  confusion  of  thought,  said  that  before 
he  had  decided  on  his  course,  he  had  examined  the  authorities, 
and  satisfied  himself  that  these  so-called  envoys  had  none  of 
the  rights  attaching  to  such  functionaries  when  properly  ap 
pointed;  and,  concluding  that  it  was  within  his  function  to 
capture  written  despatches,  assumed  consequently  that  he  had 
a  right  to  take  from  under  a  neutral  flag  personages  of  dis 
tinction  as  the  embodiment  of  despatches. 

At  Washington  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  next  addressed  a 
congratulatory  letter  to  Captain  Wilkes  on  the  "great  public 
service"  he  had  rendered,  giving  to  his  proceeding  the  "em 
phatic  approval  of  this  department."  He,  however,  took 
pains  to  insist  that  the  forbearance  of  the  commander  of  the 
San  Jacinto  in  this  instance  in  not  seizing  the  Trent  and  send 
ing  it  into  port  for  adjudication  by  a  Prize  Court  "must  by 
no  means  be  permitted  to  constitute  a  precedent  hereafter  for 
the  treatment  of  any  case  of  similar  infraction  of  neutral  obli- 


i8 

gations."  In  his  annual  official  report  a  few  days  later,  Secre 
tary  Welles  further  stated  that  the  "prompt  and  decisive 
action  of  Captain  Wilkes  on  this  occasion  merited  and  received 
emphatic  approval."  On  Monday,  December  2,  Congress 
assembled,  and  before  the  close  of  the  first  day's  session  Mr. 
Lovejoy,  of  Illinois,  offered  a  joint  resolution  thanking  Captain 
Wilkes,  "for  his  brave,  adroit  and  patriotic  conduct  in  the 
arrest  and  detention  of  the  traitors,  James  M.  Mason  and 
John  Slidell."  This  resolution  was  passed  by  a  unanimous 
vote;  and,  furthermore,  the  President  was  requested  to  present 
to  Captain  Wilkes  "a  gold  medal  with  suitable  emblems  and 
devices,  in  testimony  of  the  high  sense  entertained  by  Congress 
of  his  good  conduct,"  etc.1  As  to  the  irresponsible  outpourings 
and  journalistic  utterances  of  those  delirious  three  weeks,  it  is 
no  exaggeration  to  say  that,  read  to-day,  they  are  more  sug 
gestive  of  the  incoherences  of  the  inmates  of  an  insane  asylum 
than  of  any  well-considered  expression  of  the  organs  of  a  sober 
and  policed  community,  —  a  community  which  half  a  century 
only  before  had  gone  to  war  in  defence  of  the  great  principles 
of  immunity  from  ocean  search,  and  seamen's  rights. 

But,  most  noticeable  and,  perhaps,  most  suggestive  of  all 
the  phases  of  that  madness,  were  the  utterances  of  the  publi 
cists,  the  supposed  authorities  on  international  law,  and  those 
who  should  have  shown  themselves  the  calmly  poised  leaders 
of  public  opinion.  Here  are  some  of  them :  — '•  Theophilus 
Parsons  was  Dane  professor  of  law  at  Harvard.  Professor 
Parsons  hurried  into  print  with  the  following  dictum:  —  "I 
am  just  as  certain  that  Wilkes  had  a  legal  right  to  take  Mason 
and  Slidell  from  the  Trent,  as  I  am  that  our  Government  has 
a  legal  right  to  blockade  the  port  of  Charleston."  Caleb 
Gushing,  in  the  administration  of  Franklin  Pierce  Attorney- 
General  of  the  United  States,  was  a  publicist,  and  a  reputed 
legal  authority.  Mr.  Gushing  now  wrote:  —  "To  conclude 
then:  In  my  judgment,  the  act  pf  Captain  Wilkes  was  one 
which  any  and  every  self-respecting  nation  must  and  would 
have  done  by  its  own  sovereign  right  and  power,  regardless 
of  consequences.  It  was  an  act  which  it  cannot  be  denied 
Great  Britain  would  have  done  under  the  same  circumstances. 

1  War  Records,  Series  II.  n.  1113. 


19 

At  the  same  time,  it  was  an  act  amply  justified  by  the  principles 
and  doctrines  of  international  jurisprudence." 

I  have  already  referred  to  R.  H.  Dana,  and  his  exclamation 
on  first  hearing  of  Captain  Wilkes'  performance.  Mr.  Dana 
now  wrote  in  an  unsigned  communication  to  the  Boston  Adver 
tiser: —  "In  the  present  case,  the  mission  [of  the  two  envoys] 
is  in  its  very  nature  necessarily  and  solely  a  mission  hostile 
to  the  United  States.  It  is  treason  within  our  municipal  law, 
and  an  act  in  the  highest  degree  hostile  within  the  law  of  nations. 
If  a  neutral  vessel  intervenes  to  carry  such  persons  on  such  a 
mission  she  commits  an  act  hostile  in  the  same  degree.  .  .  .  We 
rather  look  to  see  Mr.  Seward  or  Mr.  Adams  call  the  immediate 
attention  of  Her  Majesty's  Government  to  this  violation  of 
neutrality  than  to  see  Lord  Lyons  or  Earl  Russell  addressing 
our  Government  on  the  subject." 

Finally,  Edward  Everett,  formerly  the  representative  of 
the  country  at  the  Court  of  St.  James  and  an  ex-Secretary 
of  State,  than  whom  no  one  stood  higher  in  general  estimation 
as  an  authority  on  topics  of  this  character,  thus  publicly  ex 
pressed  himself:  —  "You  see  that  there  is  not  the  slightest 
ground  for  apprehension  that  there  is  any  illegality  in  this 
detention  of  the  mail  packet;  that  the  detention  was  perfectly 
lawful,  the  capture  was  perfectly  lawful,  their  confinement  in 
Fort  Warren  will  be  perfectly  lawful,  and  as  they  will  no  doubt 
be  kept  there  in  safety  until  the  restoration  of  peace  —  which 
we  all  so  much  desire  —  we  may,  I  am  sure,  cordially  wish 
them  a  safe  and  speedy  deliverance."1 

1  In  an  address  on  the  State  of  the  Country,  delivered  before  the  Middlesex 
Mechanics'  Association,  at  Lowell,  on  Tuesday  evening,  December  24,  1861. 

There  has  been  a  diversity  of  statement  as  respects  Lewis  Cass  and  his  atti 
tude  and  utterances  in  this  connection.  By  some  it  has  been  asserted  that  he 
also  was  positive  that  the  action  of  Captain  Wilkes  was  justifiable,  both  on  prin 
ciple  and  by  precedent.  Such,  however,  was  in  no  degree  the  case.  On  the 
contrary,  the  only  recorded  expression  of  opinion  by  Mr.  Cass  is  refreshing 
from  its  correctness;  its  practical  view  of  the  matter  also  strongly  coincided 
with  what  Lord  Palmerston,  as  will  next  be  seen,  had  said  to  Mr.  Adams 
shortly  before.  The  conclusions  of  General  Cass  are  found  in  a  letter  addressed 
to  Secretary  Seward  from  Detroit,  on  the  igth  of  December,  1861.  In  his  re 
tirement  from  active  political  life,  General  Cass  then  wrote:  —  "Though  I  think 
it  was  justifiable  upon  the  grounds  laid  down  and  acted  upon  by  England,  yet  I 
considered  it  a  most  useless  and  unfortunate  affair  —  an  affair  which  from  its 
evident  importance  should  never  have  been  undertaken  by  Captain  Wilkes  with 
out  express  orders  from  his  Government,  and  his  interference  is  the  more  inex- 


2O 

But  the  time  at  our  disposal  would  not  nearly  admit  of  going 
through  all  the  kaleidoscopic  phases  of  this  singular  but  most 
interesting  and  instructive  international  episode.  The  point 
of  view  now  changes.  We  must  imagine  ourselves  in  London, 
and  Englishmen. 

r  On  Tuesday,  November  12,  four  days  after  the  actual  seizure 
of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell,  but  fifteen  days  before  an  inti 
mation  of  it  reached  England,  Mr.  Adams,  then  representing 
the  country  at  the  Court  of  St.  James,  made  this  diary  entry 
—  "Received  a  familiar  note  from  Lord  Palmerston,  asking 
me  to  call  and  see  him  between  one  and  two  o'clock."  The 
note,  of  the  briefest  possible  character,  read  as  follows :  — 

92  PICCADILLY,  12  Nov.,  1861. 
MY  DEAR  SIR: 

I  should  be  very  glad  to  have  a  few  minutes  conversation  with  you; 
could  you  without  inconvenience  call  upon  me  here  today  at  any 
time  between  one  and  two. 

Yrs  faithfully 

PALMERSTON. 
The  Honbl.  Mr.  Adams. 

Though  Mr.  Adams  had  at  this  time  been  nearly  six  months 
in  London,  his  official  relations  had  been  exclusively  with 
Earl  Russell;  and,  though  he  had  met  Lord  Palmerston  several 
times,  and  more  than  once  been  a  guest  at  Cambridge  House, 
their  intercourse  had  been  social  only.  A  few  days  before 
Mr.  Adams  had  been  present  at  the  Lord  Mayor's  dinner,  and 
had  been  one  of  the  speakers  on  that  occasion.  In  his  diary 
entry  is  the  following:  "The  only  marking  speech  being  one 
from  Lord  Palmerston  which  had  his  customary  shrewdness. 
He  touched  gently  on  our  difficulties  and  at  the  same  time 
gave  it  clearly  to  be  understood  that  there  is  to  be  no  inter- 

cusable  as  he  states  in  his  report  that  in  his  search  into  the  authorities  upon  the 
law  of  nations  he  could  find  no  such  case  decided  and  was  brought  to  consider  the 
rebel  commissioners  as  the  '  embodiment  of  despatches '  —  I  think  is  his  phrase  — 
in  order  to  justify  the  arrest;  a  strange  reason  to  be  officially  given  for  such  a 
procedure.  And  what  has  amazed  me  more  than  anything  else  in  this  whole 
affair  are  the  laudations  bestowed  upon  Captain  Wilkes  for  his  courage  in  taking 
three  or  four  unarmed  men  out  of  an  unarmed  vessel."  War  Records,  Series  II. 
n.  1132.  This  position  evinced  consistency  also,  as  Cass,  when  Secretary  of 
State,  had  clearly  and  fully  laid  down  the  American  principles  of  neutral 
rights  in  a  despatch,  June  27,  1859,  addressed  to  John  Y.  Mason,  then  Minister 
to  France,  and  a  brother  of  James  M.  Mason. 


21 

ference  for  the  sake  of  cotton."  Shortly  after,  but  before  the 
news  of  the  Trent  affair  arrived,  Mr.  Adams  made  the  following 
further  diary  entry:  —  "In  the  evening  Mrs.  Adams  and  I 
went  by  invitation  to  Lady  Palmerston's.  A  few  persons  only, 
after  one  of  her  dinners.  We  had  been  invited  to  dine  our 
selves,  last  Saturday,  and  are  again  invited  for  next  Saturday 
evening.  This  civility  is  so  significant  that  it  must  by  no 
means  be  declined.  ...  I  touched  Lord  Palmerston  a  little 
on  the  event  of  the  day,  [the  burning  of  the  Harvey  Birch  by 
the  Confederate  cruiser  Nashville],  and  reminded  him  of  the 
connection  which  the  Nashville  had  with  our  former  conver 
sation.  He  seemed  good-natured  and  rather  desirous  to  get 
information  as  to  grounds  on  which  to  act."  The  relations 
between  the  two  men  had  accordingly  thus  far  been  of  an 
altogether  friendly  character.  The  diary  entry  of  November 
12  goes  on  as  follows:  — 

This  (Lord  Palmerston's  note)  took  me  by  surprise,  and  I  specu 
lated  on  the  cause  for  some  time  without  any  satisfaction.  At  one 
o'clock  I  drove  from  my  house  over  to  his,  Cambridge  House  in 
Piccadilly.  In  a  few  minutes  he  saw  me.  His  reception  was  very 
cordial  and  frank.  He  said  he  had  been  made  anxious  by  a  notice 
that  a  United  States  armed  vessel  l  had  lately  put  in  to  Southampton 
to  get  coal  and  supplies.  It  had  been  intimated 'to  him  that  that 
object  was  to  intercept  the  two  men,  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell, 
who  were  understood  to  be  aboard  the  British  West  India  steamer 
expected  to  arrive  tomorrow  or  next  day.  He  had  been  informed 
that  the  Captain,  having  got  gloriously  drunk  on  brandy  on  Sunday 
had  dropped  down  to  the  mouth  of  the  river  yesterday  as  if  on  the 
watch.  He  did  not  pretend  to  judge  absolutely  of  the  question 
whether  we  had  a  right  to  stop  a  foreign  vessel  for  such  a  purpose 
as  was  indicated.  Even  admitting  that  we  might  claim  it,  it  was 
yet  very  doubtful  whether  the  exercise  of  it  in  this  way  could  lead 
to  any  good.  The  effect  of  it  here  would  be  unfavorable,  as  it  would 
seem  as  if  the  vessel  had  come  in  here  to  be  filled  with  coal  and  sup 
plies,  and  the  Captain  had  enjoyed  the  hospitality  of  the  country 
in  filling  his  stomach  with  brandy,  only  to  rush  out  of  the  harbor 
and  commit  violence  upon  their  flag.  Neither  did  the  object  to  be 

1  The  James  Adger,  commanded  by  Captain  J.  B.  Marchant.  In  regard  to  this 
incident,  see  Charles  Francis  Adams  (Am.  Statesmen  Series),  222-224;  Records 
of  Union  and  Confederate  Navies,  i.  128,  224;.  Adams,  Studies:  Military  and 
Diplomatic,  394. 


22 

gained  seem  commensurate  with  the  risk.  For  it  was  surely  of  no 
consequence  whether  one  or  two  more  men  were  added  to  the  two 
or  three  who  had  already  been  so  long  here.  They  would  scarcely 
make  a  difference  in  the  action  of  the  government  after  once  having 
made  up  its  mind. 

The  remainder  of  this  diary  entry  is  long,  and  not  germane 
to  the  present  occasion.  I,  therefore,  omit  it.  But  the  ex 
treme  significance  of  the  intimation  thus  unofficially  and  pleas 
antly  conveyed  was  not  apparent  at  the  time;  indeed  it  was 
not  fully  disclosed  until  half  a  century  later.  Mr.  Adams 
never  knew  the  motive  cause  of  the  interview  he  was  describing, 
and  consequently  never  appreciated  the  really  kind  purpose 
behind  this  most  friendly  action  of  the  man  at  the  head  of  the 
government  to  which  he  was  accredited.  It  was  an  effort 
to  forestall  and  prevent  an  international  complication  even 
more  objectless  than  it  was  dangerous,  a  senseless  wrangle  over 
two  men  who  were  of  no  consequence  anyway. 

To  appreciate  the  true  significance  of  the  interview  described 
in  his  diary  by  Mr.  Adams  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that 
it  took  place  on  the  1 2th  of  November,  the  Confederate  envoys 
having  been  taken  on  the  8th  from  the  Trent.  On  the  day 
preceding  his  talk  with  Mr.  Adams,  Lord  Palmerston,  it  now 
appears,  had  addressed  the  following  letter  to  J.  T.  Delane, 
the  editor  of  the  Times: 

94,  PICCADILLY,  November  n,  1861. 
MY  DEAR  DELANE: 

It  may  be  useful  to  you  to  know  that  the  Chancellor,  Dr.  Lush- 
ington,  the  three  Law  Officers,  Sir  G.  Grey,  the  Duke  of  Somerset, 
and  myself,  met  at  the  Treasury  today  to  consider  what  we  could 
properly  do  about  the  American  cruiser  come,  no  doubt,  to  search 
the  West  Indian  packet  supposed  to  be  bringing  hither  the  two  South 
ern  envoys;  and,  much  to  my  regret,  it  appeared  that,  according  to 
the  principles  of  international  law  laid  down  in  our  courts  by  Lord 
Stowell,  and  practised  and  enforced  by  us,  a  belligerent  has  a  right 
to  stop  and  search  any  neutral  not  being  a  ship  of  war,  and  being 
found  on  the  high  seas  and  being  suspected  of  carrying  enemy's 
despatches;  and  that  consequently  this  American  cruiser  might, 
by  our  own  principles  of  international  law,  stop  the  West  Indian 
packet,  search  her,  and  if  the  Southern  men  and  their  despatches 
and  credentials  were  found  on  board,  either  take  them  out,  or  seize 
the  packet  and  carry  her  back  to  New  York  for  trial.  Such  being 


23 

the  opinion  of  our  men  learned  in  the  law,  we  have  determined  to 
do  no  more  than  to  order  the  Phaeton  frigate  to  drop  down  to  Yar 
mouth  Roads  and  watch  the  proceedings  of  the  American  within 
our  three-mile  limit  of  territorial  jurisdiction,  and  to  prevent  her 
from  exercising  within  that  limit  those  rights  which  we  cannot  dis 
pute  as  belonging  to  her  beyond  that  limit. 

In  the  meanwhile  the  American  captain,  having  got  very  drunk 
this  morning  at  Southampton  with  some  excellent  brandy,  and 
finding  it  blow  heavily  at  sea,  has  come  to  an  anchor  for  the  night 
within  Calshot  Castle,  at  the  entrance  of  the  Southampton  river. 

I  mention  these  things  for  your  private  information. 
Yours  sincerely, 

PALMERSTON. 

And,  the  following  day,  immediately  after  his  talk  with  Mr. 
Adams,  he  further  wrote :  — 

MY  DEAR  DELANE: 

I  have  seen  Adams  today,  and  he  assures  me  that  the  American 
paddle-wheel  was  sent  to  intercept  the  Nashville  if  found  in  these 
seas,  but  not  to  meddle  with  any  ship  under  a  foreign  flag.  He  said 
he  had  seen  the  commander,  and  had  advised  him  to  go  straight  home; 
and  he  believed  the  steamer  to  be  now  on  her  way  back  to  the  United 
States.  This  is  a  very  satisfactory  explanation. 

Yours  sincerely, 

PALMERSTON. 

While  the  opinion  of  the  officers  of  the  Crown  referred  to  was 
no  mystery  at  the  time,  and  is  mentioned,  though  in  much 
more  general  language,  by  Spencer  Walpole  in  his  Life  of  Lord 
Russell  (n.  354-356),  yet  the  statement  here  made  of  that 
opinion  by  Lord  Palmerston  is  well  calculated  to  excite  sur 
prise.  It  will  be  noticed  that  the  officers  referred  to  —  the 
Lord  Chancellor,  Westbury,  and  Dr.  Lushington  being  among 
them  —  are  said  to  have  laid  it  down  as  law  that  the  belligerent 
had  a  right  to  stop  and  search  any  neutral,  not  being  a  ship 
of  war,  on  the  high  seas,  suspected  of  carrying  enemy's  de 
spatches.  Consequently,  then,  in  this  case,  the  Southern  in 
surgents  having  been  granted  belligerent  rights,  the  San  Jacinto 
might,  on  English  principles  of  international  law,  stop  the 
Trent,  search  her,  and  if  the  Southern  men  were  on  board, 
either  do  exactly  what  Captain  Wilkes  had  already  just  done, 
—  take  them  out,  and  then  allow  the  packet  to  proceed  on  its 


24 

voyage,  —  or  seize  the  packet  and  carry  her  to  some  American 
port  for  trial  and  adjudication  as  prize. 

Here  is  indeed  another  turn  of  the  Trent  kaleidoscope,  — • 
a  British  turn!  That  just  half  a  century  ago  such  an  opinion 
as  this  should  have  been  advanced  as  accepted  international 
law  seems  incredible.  It  indicates  clearly  how  confused,  as 
well  as  archaic,  the  principles  of  that  law  were  at  the  time  in 
question  in  the  minds  of  those  supposed  to  be  learned  in  it.  No 
war  involving  maritime  rights  to  any  considerable  extent  had 
occurred  since  Waterloo.  The  precedents  established  in  the 
English  Prize  Courts  in  the  days  of  Napoleon's  "  Continental 
System"  and  the  British  "Orders  in  Council,"  and  the  prin 
ciples  then  laid  down,  utterly  regardless  as  they  notoriously 
had  been  of  the  rights  of  neutrals,  were  held  to  be  still  law. 
Those  precedents  and  rulings  were  of  the  most  miscellaneous 
description  and  arbitrary  character.  Meanwhile,  the  world 
had  progressed.  It  is,  therefore,  simply  astounding  to  us  in 
1911  that  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown  should  in  1861  have 
advised  her  Majesty's  government  that  an  American  ship- 
of-war  might  lie  in  the  straits  of  Dover,  and,  having  reason  to 
suppose  that  an  emissary  of  the  Confederacy,  carrying  de 
spatches,  was  on  a  certain  steamer,  —  the  Calais  packet,  for 
instance,  —  could  stop  the  steamer  in  question,  subject  it  to 
search,  and  either  take  out  the  envoy  referred  to,  and  his 
despatches,  leaving  the  steamer  then  to  complete  its  course, 
or  could  pronounce  her  a  prize  of  war  for  violation  of  neutrality, 
and  send  her  into  port  for  adjudication!  Or,  to  put  the  case 
in  a  different  way,  difficulties  of  a  revolutionary  character 
have  recently  occurred  in  Mexico,  and  are  now,  as  is  well  known, 
agitating  Portugal.  Is  it  supposable  that  a  Mexican  or  Portu 
guese  man-of-war  commissioned  by  the  recognized  govern 
ment,  rights  of  belligerency  having  for  reasons  of  commerce 
or  humanity  been  conceded,  —  is  it,  I  say,  even  remotely  sup 
posable  that,  under  such  circumstances,  a  Mexican  or  Portu 
guese  battleship  could  now  lie  in  wait  off  Long  Island  on  the 
course  of  the  trans-Atlantic  steamers,  and,  having  sufficient 
reason  to  believe  that  either  despatches  were  being  carried 
in  those  steamers,  or  that  a  Mexican  or  Portuguese  envoy  was 
among  its  passengers,  could  proceed  to  stop  and  search  the 
ocean-liner,  forcibly  arrest  the  persons  in  question,  and  with 


25 

them  steam  away,  or,  then  and  there,  compel  the  ship  —  the 
Lusitania  or  the  Oceanic,  let  us  say  —  to  abandon  its  voyage, 
and  send  it  into  a  Mexican  or  Portuguese  port  for  adjudication! l 
The  thing  is  too  absurd  for  a  moment's  consideration.  Yet 
then  it  seems  to  have  been  laid  down  as  the  accepted  law  of 
Great  Britain;  and  according  to  Lord  Chancellor  Westbury 
and  Dr.  Lushington,  Mr.  George  Sumner,  the  brother  of  the 
Senator  of  the  same  name,  was  not  wrong  when  at  this  time 
(November  22)  he  wrote  to  the  New  York  Tribune  that,  "The 
act  of  Commodore  Wilkes  was  in  strict  accordance  with  the 
principles  of  international  law  recognized  in  England,  and  in 
strict  conformity  with  English  practice."  One  American  at 
least  seems  here  to  have  then  spoken  correctly  and  by  the 
book.  He  said  "English  principles"  and  "English  practice"! 
If  it  was  law  and  practice  in  Great  Britain  then,  it  was  law 
and  practice  nowhere  else;  least  of  all  in  the  United  States. 

But  was  the  position  thus  taken  sound  as  a  proposition  of 
even  British  law?  This  is  open  to  grave  question;  nor  did  it 
pass  unchallenged  at  the  time.  The  point  was  well  put  by  the 
Duke  of  Argyll,  himself  a  member  of  the  British  ministry,  in  a 
letter  to  Mr.  Adams  written  on  the  25th  of  the  following  Jan 
uary.2  Referring  to  the  objection  subsequently  made  to  the 
act  of  Captain  Wilkes  that  the  Trent  was  not  taken  into  port 
for  adjudication,  he  characterized  it  as  one  made  on  "a  narrow 
and  technical  ground."  He  then  proceeded  as  follows:  "This 
is  a  very  minor  objection,  tho'  so  far  as  it  goes,  a  sound  one. 
But  the  real  objection  I  hold  to  be  a  much  stronger  one,  mz.y 
that  a  neutral  vessel,  with  a  bona  fide,  neutral  destination , 

1  These  very  instances  were  at  the  time  cited  as  possibilities  by  Earl  Russell 
in  his  despatch  to  Lord  Lyons,  closing  the  discussion  on  the  side  of  the  British 
government.    In  addition  thereto  the  following  —  "So  also  a  Confederate  vessel- 
of-war  [e.  g.  the  Alabama]  might  capture  a  Cunard  steamer  on  its  way  from 
Halifax  to  Liverpool,  on  the  ground  of  its  carrying  despatches  from  Mr.  Seward 
to  Mr.  Adams."    It  is  difficult  now  of  belief  that  in  1861  an  experienced  American 
naval  officer  should  have  undertaken  to  establish  a  precedent  logically  implying 
such  obvious  consequences,  and  this  on  his  own  initiative;  that  the  most  learned 
legal  authorities  in  America  should  have  unequivocally  sustained  him  in  such 
an  act,  insisting  on  its  unquestionable  legality,  fairly  surpasses  belief.    Yet  the 
evidence  is  conclusive  that  at  the  time  American  public  opinion  was  well-nigh 
unanimous  in  support  of  the  proposition,  and  had  persuaded  itself,  or  was  per 
suaded,  that  Great  Britain  should  be  held  to  a  future  strict  responsibility  and 
account  for  failing  to  give  immediate  and  willing  assent  to  it. 

2  See  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings,  Vol.  45,  p.  137. 


26 

cannot  contain  contraband  of  war  at  all,  and  that  civilians, 
especially,  bound  for  a  neutral  country  cannot,  under  any 
circumstances,  be  held  to  be  subject  to  seizure  as  Contraband. 
I  venture  to  affirm  that  no  decision  of  any  of  our  Judges,  nor 
any  act  of  our  Government  can  be  cited  as  inconsistent  with 
this  doctrine." 

This,  even  if  advanced  by  a  layman,  was  certainly  good  sense, 
and  probably  sound  law.  Admitting,  however,  that  as  a  mere 
proposition  of  existing  law,  wise  or  not  wise  as  a  question  of 
policy,  the  British  precedents  and  practice  were  as  laid  down 
by  the  law-advisers  of  the  Crown,  if  such  a  contingency  as  that 
of  the  Trent  arose  there  was  but  one  course  to  be  pursued 
by  any  self-respecting  nation.  If  such  was  once  the  law, 
the  world  had  outgrown  it;  it  was  law  no  longer.  In  any 
event,  it  could  not  possibly  be  observed  as  such  by  any  nation 
powerful  enough  to  set  it  at  naught.  The  case  did  not  admit 
of  argument. 

The  course,  therefore,  to  be  pursued  by  the  British  Govern 
ment  under  the  circumstances  which  then  confronted  it,  was 
simple,  and  exactly  the  course  that  was  pursued.  The  matter 
was  referred  back  to  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown,  with  in 
structions  to  reconsider  the  subject.  The  subject  was  recon 
sidered,  and  different  conclusions  arrived  at.  Nevertheless, 
those  conclusions  commend  themselves  little  more  to  present 
judgment  than  the  previous  opinion.  It  was  now  held  that 
what  had  been  done  in  the  Trent  case  was  illegal  because  in 
assuming  authority  under  the  accepted  law  of  nations,  as  laid 
down  in  the  reports  and  treatises,  Captain  Wilkes  had  under 
taken  to  pass  upon  the  issue  of  a  violation  of  neutrality  on  the 
spot,  instead  of  sending  the  Trent  as  a  prize  into  port  for  judi 
cial  adjudication.  There  is  about  the  position  thus  assumed 
in  1 86 1  something  which  seems  in  1911  little  short  of  the  gro 
tesque.  Nevertheless,  so  the  case  stood  at  that  time;  and,  as 
mere  technical  law,  the  point  probably  was,  as  the  Duke  of 
Argyll  said  in  his  letter  to  Mr.  Adams,  well  taken.  At  any  rate 
it  met  in  a  way  the  requirements  of  that  particular  occasion, 
and  was  gravely  advanced  and  argued  over  pro  and  con  by 
able  and  adroit  men  holding  high  official  positions.  It  was, 
however,  recognized  all  through  as  a  solemn  farce.  As  a 
question  of  practical  statesmanship,  the  world  manifestly  had 


27 

burst  asunder  those  particular  swaddling  clothes.     It  is  con 
tentions  of  this  character  which  bring  law  into  contempt. 

One  more  turn  of  the  kaleidoscope,  and  I  am  through  for 
this  occasion.  Leaving  London  and  the  legal  advisers  of  Her 
Majesty's  Government,  we  travel  back  to  Boston.  The  San 
Jacinto,  with  the  two  Confederate  envoys  on  board,  —  more 
guests  of  the  Captain  than  prisoners  of  state,1 — steamed  into 
Boston  harbor  on  the  24th  of  November.  Fort  Warren  had 
been  designated  as,  pro  hac  vice,  the  American  Tower,  or  Bas- 
tile.  Fort  Warren  is  situated  on  George's  Island,  commanding 
the  main  ship-channel,  so  called,  at  the  entrance  of  Boston 
harbor.  Small  in  area,  the  island  is  almost  entirely  covered 
by  the  fort;  and,  as  is  well  known,  the  sea-shore  of  Massachu 
setts  Bay  is,  as  a  winter  resort,  inclement.  Though,  as  already 
mentioned,  both  Mr.  Mason  and  Mr.  Slidell  were  peculiarly 
obnoxious  to  the  loyal  North  and  especially  to  New  Englanders, 
there  were  a  number  of  residents  of  Boston  who  had  in  one  way 
or  another  been  personally  associated  with  them  in  former 
times,  and  even  under  obligations  to  them.  Among  these  was 
Mr.  Robert  C.  Winthrop,  long  a  member  of  Congress  from  Mas 
sachusetts,  speaker  of  the  national  House  of  Representatives, 
and,  for  a  time,  the  occupant  of  a  seat  in  the  United  States 
Senate.  Those  were  the  days  of  the  comparatively  "simple  life " 
in  Washington,  and  while  in  the  Senate  together  Mr.  Mason  and 
Mr.  Winthrop  had  belonged  to  the  same  "mess,"  as  the  board 
ing-house  arrangements  of  those  days  were  termed.  As  Mr. 
Winthrop  now  wrote  in  a  familiar  letter  to  Mr.  John  P.  Kennedy, 
another  of  his  Congressional  associates,  referring  to  the  dedi 
cation  in  1857  °f  tne  statue  of  Joseph  Warren  in  Bunker  Hill 
monument,  when  he  had  introduced  both  Mr.  Mason  and 
Mr.  Kennedy,  —  "His  tone  was  insolent  enough  on  that  occa 
sion,2  yet  I  will  not  triumph  over  him  now.  ...  I  sent  down 
some  sherry  a  fortnight  ago,  and  offered  to  go  myself,  but  the 
officer  said  I  could  speak  to  none  of  them.  ...  I  also  helped 
to  get  some  great  coats  to  prevent  the  North  Carolina  soldiers 
from  freezing."  There  certainly  was  biblical  authority  for  such 
action  under  these  circumstances  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Winthrop. 
At  the  same  juncture,  it  so  chanced  that  Colonel  H.  Raymond 

1  Mason,  Public  Life,  224,  225. 

8  But  on  this  point  see  Mason,  Public  Life,  123-125. 


28 

Lee  and  Major  Paul  J.  Revere,  of  the  2oth  Massachusetts  Vol 
unteers,  were  with  other  Massachusetts  officers  prisoners  of 
war  at  Richmond.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  as  such  they  were 
treated  with  great  severity,  almost  indeed  as  if  they  had  been 
common  criminals.  If,  however,  at  that  time  any  prominent 
citizen  of  Richmond,  who  had  previously  received  attentions 
at  their  hands  in  Boston,  had  endeavored  to  alleviate  the  hard 
ships  of  prison  life,  we  can  feel  assured  he  would  have  been 
denounced  by  the  Southern  press  as  supplying  luxuries  to  those 
who  could  only  be  compared  with  the  minions  of  Attila  or  some 
other  great  barbarian  destroyer.  In  those  days  somewhat 
exaggerated  metaphors  and  comparisons  were  in  over-common 
use,  and,  as  will  immediately  be  seen,  history  quite  failed  to 
supply  either  of  the  two  sides  with  precedents  or  examples 
equal  to  the  occasion's  requirements.  Until  then  the  lowest 
depths  of  depravity  had  not  been  sounded;  " history  did  not 
record,  "etc.,  etc. !  And  yet  even  at  that  juncture  such  Samaritan 
action  as  that  suggested  on  the  part  of  some  Richmond  resi 
dent  towards  Lee  and  Revere  would  hardly  have  been  regarded 
in  Boston  as  conduct  suitable  for  bitter  denunciation  only. 
Thus  viewed,  in  alterant  partem,  it  is  curious  now  to  read  the 
bitter  words  in  which  the  very  simple  courtesy  of  Mr.  Winthrop 
and  others  was  denounced  by  the  New  England  press.  The 
Boston  Transcript,  for  instance,  in  its  issue  of  Thursday  evening, 
December  12,  1861,  gave  vent  to  the  following  growl:  "We  beg 
to  suggest  to  those  whom  it  may  concern  to  leave  the  care  of 
men,  one  of  whom  is  the  personification  of  arrogance,  and  the 
other  of  craft,  to  the  proper  authorities.  We  beg  them  not 
again  to  outrage  public  opinion  by  sending  their  champagne 
and  other  luxuries  to  the  avowed  enemies  of  the  United  States." 
And  yet  this  merely  echoed  an  utterance  from  Governor  Andrew, 
conveyed  in  a  private  but  published  letter  dated  at  the  State 
House,  December  nth.  Referring  to  what  he  termed  "the 
numerous  manifestations  of  misplaced  sympathy  by  some  citi 
zens  of  Boston  with  the  rebel  prisoners  confined  at  Fort  War 
ren,"  Governor  Andrew  then  said:  "I  fully  appreciate  your 
feelings  in  this  matter,  and  share  with  the  writer  of  the  Post  in 
his  condemnation  of  that  sympathy  with  traitors,  which  makes 
men  in  comparison  with  whom  Benedict  Arnold  was  a  saint, 
comfortable  in  their  confinement,  while  our  own  brave  defenders 


29 

of  liberty  and  Union  and  the  rights  of  man,  are  cut  off  from  all 
such  sympathy  by  the  rigorous  despotism  of  the  Southern 
oligarchy,  —  but  I  do  not  know  of  anything  that  I  can  do  to 
prevent  it."  When  such  utterances  emanate  from  a  man  of 
the  high  character  and  natural  kindliness  of  Governor  Andrew, 
it  is  possible  for  those  who  did  not,  as  well  as  for  those  who  did 
live  in  those  times,  to  imagine  the  grim  murkiness,  so  to  speak, 
of  the  language  elsewhere  heard.  For  example,  here  is  an  illus 
trative  extract  from  the  newspapers  of  the  time:  "Mr.  Wendell 
Phillips,  in  a  lecture  delivered  at  the  New  Music  Hall  on  the 
evening  of  Wednesday,  November  27,  1861,  observed:  'If  at 
the  outbreak'  of  the  present  troubles  Breckinridge,  Mason, 
Slidell,  Toombs,  Hunter,  Wise,  and  others  had  been  hung,  and 
a  frigate  or  two  had  been  sent  to  Charleston,  Savannah  and 
New  Orleans,  and  shelled  those  cities,  there  never  would  have 
been  any  rebellion."3  Mr.  Phillips  was  never  conspicuous  for 
tolerance  or  for  moderation  of  speech,  nor  could  any  marked 
degree  of  sanity  of  judgment  be  fairly  attributed  to  him;  it  is, 
however,  at  this  distance  of  time  curious  to  learn  that  even  he 
should  in  1861  have  so  utterly  misjudged  the  courage  as  well 
as  the  earnestness  of  the  South.  But  in  191 1  it  has  an  even  more 
curious  and  exaggerated  sound  to  hear  John  A.  Andrew  referring 
to  the  two  Confederates  in  question  as  men  in  comparison  with 
whom  " Benedict  Arnold  was  a  saint."  Whatever  may  be  said 
against  either  Mr.  Mason  or  Mr.  Slidell,  —  and  much  certainly 
can  in  both  justice  and  truth  be  said,  —  it  can  never  be  asserted 
that  they  were  guilty  of  treachery  or  of  secret  treasons.  They 
proclaimed  their  opinions  loudly  enough,  and  thereon,  early  and 
late,  "made  good."  Nevertheless,  Mr.  Winthrop's  attitude 
towards  them  on  this  occasion  excited  so  much  feeling  that  he 
wrote  to  his  friend  Kennedy  as  follows:  "A  miserable  clamor 
has  been  raised  by  a  few  of  our  bitter  spirits  because  some  per 
sons  have  sent  down  a  few  creature  comforts  to  alleviate  the 
condition  of  old  friends.  One  of  our  malignant  presses  calls 
us  sympathizers  in  Rebellion  and  threatens  to  send  our  names 
to  the  Secretary  of  State!  I  hope  you  will  give  Seward  to  under 
stand  that  a  malicious  spirit  of  misrepresentation  prevails  in 
this  quarter,  which  vents  itself  upon  everybody  who  is  not 
ready  to  embark  in  an  Abolition  Crusade.  For  myself,  I  have 
done  so  little  for  the  prisoners,  that  I  feel  a  compunction  at 


30 

having  seemed  wanting  in  kindness.  It  is  wretched  policy  not 
to  treat  them  with  humanity  and  consideration."  This  episode 
constitutes  a  mere  insignificant  footnote  in  the  record  of  that 
period;  but  it  brings  forcibly  to  mind  the  morbid  and  unreason 
ing  state  of  public  opinion. 

One  point  further,  and  a  point  curiously  illustrative  of  the 
thoroughness  with  which  this  particular  piece  of  historical 
ground  has  been  gone  over,  and  the  difficulty  of  now  reaching 
any  novel  conclusions  in  regard  to  those  who  played  their 
parts  in  connection  with  it.  As  a  final  result  of  recent  in 
vestigations  I  had  reached  the  conclusion  that,  among  those 
occupying  positions  of  prominence  and  political  responsibility 
in  American  public  life  at  the  time,  two  only  preserved  their 
poise  throughout  the  Mason  and  Slidell  episode,  and,  taking 
in  all  the  aspects  of  the  situation,  both  acted  with  discretion  and 
counselled  wisely.  These  two  were  Montgomery  Blair,  the 
Postmaster  General  in  Lincoln's  Cabinet,  and,  somewhat  strange 
to  say,  Charles  Sumner.  They  alone,  using  the  vernacular,  did 
not  "slop  over,"  prematurely  and  inconsiderately  committing 
either  themselves  or  the  country,  whether  in  private  speech  or 
public  utterance.  Though  not  quoted  at  the  time,  Mr.  Blair's 
attitude  was  the  more  pronounced.  According  to  Secretary 
Welles,  he  "from  the  first  denounced  Wilkes's  act  as  unauthor 
ized,  irregular  and  illegal";  and  even  went  so  far  as  to  advise 
that  Wilkes  be  ordered  to  take  the  San  Jacinto  and  go  with 
Mason  and  Slidell  to  England,  and  deliver  them  to  the  British 
Government.1  In  view  of  the  excitement  and  unreasoning  con 
dition  of  the  public  mind  such  a  disposition  of  the  question  was, 
perhaps,  practically  impossible;  though  even  this  admits  of 
question.  Nevertheless,  seen  through  the  vista  of  half  a  cen 
tury,  this  would  clearly  have  been  the  wisest  as  well  as  the  most 
dignified  course  to  pursue,  far  more  so  than  that  ultimately 
adopted;  for,  as  Secretary  Welles,  a  dozen  years  later,  wrote, 
"  the  prompt  and  voluntary  disavowal  of  the  act  of  Wilkes,  and 
delivering  over  the  prisoners,  would  have  evinced  our  confi 
dence  in  our  own  power,  and  been  a  manifestation  of  our  in 
difference  and  contempt  for  the  emissaries,  and  a  rebuke  to  the 

1  This  course  was,  it  is  said,  also  at  the  moment  advocated  by  General  Mc- 
Clellan,  then  organizing  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  practically  commander- 
in-chief  in  succession  to  General  Scott.  Russell,  My  Diary,  ir.  405. 


alleged  intrigues  between  the  rebels  and  the  English  cabinet." l 
Mr.  Welles  might  have  further  remarked  that  such  a  disposi 
tion  of  the  matter,  besides  being  in  strict  consistency  with  a 
long-proclaimed  international  policy,  would  have  afforded  for 
the  navy  a  most  salutary  disciplinary  example. 

As  I  have  said,  the  attitude  and  bearing  of  Mr.  Sumner 
throughout  those  trying  days  was  above  criticism.  With  a 
proper  sense  of  the  responsibility  due  to  his  official  position, 
that  of  Chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela 
tions,  he  was  silent,  biding  his  time;  and,  when  that  time  came, 
he  used  his  influence  in  such  a  way  as  to  produce  results  not 
wholly  unworthy  of  a  great  nation  passing  through  a  trying 
ordeal.  This  conclusion  I  had  reached,  and  was  prepared  to  set 
forth  as  one  that  might  have  a  certain  degree  of  novelty  as  well 
as  weight,  the  matured  judgment  of  half  a  century  subsequent 
to  the  event.  Fortunately  for  myself,  before  so  doing,  I  glanced 
once  more  over  the  pages  of  our  associate,  Mr.  James  Ford 
Rhodes.  In  the  chapter  of  his  History  (in.  523-524)  in  which 
he  deals  with  the  affair  of  the  Trent,  I  then  found  the  following: 
—  "Of  all  the  men  in  responsible  positions,  Sumner  and  Blair 
saw  the  clearest.  They  were  in  favor  of  at  once  surrendering 
to  England  the  Confederate  Commissioners." 

My  "novel"  judgment,  slowly  reached  at  the  close  of  half  a 
century,  had  been,  it  would  thus  appear,  anticipated  by  my 
associate  here  by  about  sixteen  years! 

But  there  is  another  aspect  of  the  Trent  affair  and  its  out 
come,  which,  from  the  historical  point  of  view,  is,  I  believe, 
novel;  and  that  in  closing  I  propose  to  bring  to  view,  emphasiz 
ing  it  as  forcibly  as  I  can.  But  in  order  to  appreciate  this 
aspect  of  the  affair  it  is  necessary  clearly  to  bear  in  mind  the 
sequence  of  events,  the  intervals  of  time  which  elapsed  and  the 
exact  date  of  each  occurrence.  The  arrest  of  the  Trent  and  the 
seizure  of  the  two  envoys  took  place  in  the  Bahama  Channel, 
November  8;  the  interview  between  Lord  Palmerston  and 
Mr.  Adams  at  Cambridge  House,  at  which  Lord  Palmerston 
suggested  that  the  presence  of  the  two  envoys  in  Europe  was 

1  Lincoln  and  Seward  (1874),  186-187.  This  was  an  opinion  formed  later 
and  on  more  mature  reflection.  At  the  time  of  the  occurrence  of  the  "affair" 
the  attitude  of  Secretary  Welles  was  pronounced,  and  his  utterances  were  pecu 
liarly  indiscreet  as  well  as  precipitate.  See  Diary,  i.  299,  466,  490. 


32 

"of  no  consequence"  and  "would  scarcely  make  a  difference 
in  the  action  of  the  government"  was  on  the  i2th,  and  the 
despatch  of  Mr.  Adams  conveying  this  most  significant  intima 
tion  to  Secretary  Seward  was  received  by  the  latter  before 
November  30.  This  was  fourteen  days  after  the  news  of  the 
seizure  had  been  made  known  in  the  United  States  (Novem 
ber  1 6)  and  the  public  excitement  had  already  begun  to  sub 
side.  Tidings  of  the  affair  had  reached  England  three  days 
only  before,  on  the  27th,  and  the  despatch  of  Earl  Russell  to 
Lord  Lyons  demanding  the  immediate  surrender  of  the  two 
envoys,  dated  November  30,  reached  Washington  December 
1 8,  or  a  little  over  a  full  month  after  the  news  of  the  seizure 
of  the  envoys  had  made  wild  the  American  public. 

At  the  time  great  emphasis  was  laid  on  the  general  prepara 
tions  for  war  entered  upon  by  the  British  government  in  case 
of  a  refusal  to  yield  to  the  ultimatum  presented.  It  was  here 
pronounced  unnecessary,  irregular,  minatory,  and  insulting; 
and  subsequent  American  historical  investigators  and  publi 
cists  have  continued  to  so  pronounce  it.  There  is  no  question 
that  Great  Britain  was  in  dead  earnest  in  its  demand  for  imme 
diate  reparation,  and  acted  accordingly.  The  arsenals  were 
busy;  all  available  forces  were  mobilized;  troops  embarked 
for  Canada. 

And  why  such  daily  cast  of  brazen  cannon, 
And  foreign  mart  for  implements  of  war; 
Why  such  impress  of  shipwrighters,  whose  sore  task 
Does  not  divide  the  Sunday  from  the  week. 
What  might  be  toward  .  .  . 

The  answer  was  ready;  as  was  then  alleged,  and  has  since 
been  reiterated,  it  was  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  a  case  of 
uncalled  for,  unnecessarily  offensive  braggadocio  and  bullying; 
and  it  was  resented  as  such.  Yet  something  was,  and  is,  fairly 
to  be  said  on  the  other  side.  The  critics  were  not  careful  as  to 
their  facts,  the  sequence  of  events  and  the  natural  operation 
of  cause  and  effect.  Again  it  is  necessary  to  bear  dates  clearly 
in  mind.  Commenting  on  this  phase  of  the  "affair,"  R.  H.  Dana, 
for  instance,  with  singular  carelessness  says  in  his  elaborate 
note  in  his  edition  of  Wheaton  —  "The  news  of  the  capture  of 
Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  reached  Washington  about  the  same 


33 

time  it  reached  London."  1  This  is  erroneous,  and  the  error 
vitiates  Mr.  Dana's  whole  criticism  on  the  minatory  course 
pursued  by  Great  Britain.  The  news  of  the  seizure,  not  "  cap 
ture,"  reached  Washington  November  16;  the  same  news  did 
not  reach  London  until  the  2yth,  or  eleven  days  later.  Those 
eleven  days  of  difference  were  pregnant  with  consequences; 
for  during  them  the  United  States  went  crazy,  and  it  was  then 
that  the  news  both  of  the  seizure  and  of  the  storm  of  American 
approval  thereof  reached  London  "  about  the  same  time." 
The  announcement  a  few  days  later  of  the  Governor  of  Massa 
chusetts  at  the  Wilkes  dinner  in  Boston  (November  26)  that 
"a  shot  fired  across  the  bows  of  the  ship  that  bore  the  English 
lion's  head"  had  filled  to  the  brim  the  cups  of  America's  satis 
faction  over  the  event,  followed  hard  by  the  "  emphatic  ap 
proval"  of  the  act  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  its  unani 
mous  endorsement  by  Congress  —  these  surely  were  not  utter 
ances  or  incidents  calculated  either  to  allay  British  excitement 
or  to  lead  to  a  countermand  of  warlike  preparation.  Even  on 
the  very  eve  of  the  surrender,  it  was  publicly  alleged  and  on 
excellent  authority  that  the  President  had  emphatically  an 
nounced: —  "I  would  sooner  die  than  give  them  up."  This 
probably  was  not  true;  it  was,  however,  believed  both  in 
Washington  and  in  London.  In  London  also  it  was  suspected, 
especially  in  inner  ministerial  circles,2  —  and  on  good  grounds 

1  Wheaton,  654,  n. 

2  The  Duke  of  Newcastle,  who  had  accompanied  the  Prince  of  Wales  in  his 
visit  to  America  in  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1860,  was  at  this  time  Colonial 
Secretary  in  the  Palmerston-Russell  government.    On  June  5,  1861,  five  months 
before  the  occurrence  of  the  Trent  affair,  he  thus  wrote  in  an  official  letter  to  Sir 
Edmund  Head,  Governor-General  of  Canada:  —  "I  entirely  concur  in  what  you 
say  in  your  letter  of  the  i8th  May  about  Mr.  Se ward's  speculations  and  unfriendly 
views  towards  Canada,  but  I  think  you  hardly  make  sufficient  allowance  for  his 
hyper-American  use  of  the  policy  of  bully  and  bluster.     When  I  saw  him  at 
Albany  last  October  he  fairly  told  me  he  should  make  use  of  insults  to  England 
to  secure  his  own  position  in  the  States,  and  that  I  must  not  suppose  he  meant 
war.    On  the  contrary,  he  did  not  wish  war  with  England,  and  he  was  confident 
we  should  never  go  to  war  with  the  States  —  we  dared  not  and  could  not  afford  it." 

On  December  5th  following,  in  the  heat  of  the  excitement  of  the  Trent  affair, 
Newcastle  wrote  to  Lord  Monck,  then  in  command  of  the  forces  in  Canada:  — 
"Soon  after  your  last  letter  was  written  [November  16]  you  must  have  learnt 
of  the  affair  of  the  Trent,  and  the  serious  complications  which  it  must  produce. 
I  am  bound  to  warn  you  that  war  is  too  likely  to  be  the  result.  Such  an  insult 
to  our  flag  can  only  be  atoned  by  the  restoration  of  the  men  who  were  seized 
when  under  its  protection,  and  with  Mr.  Seward  at  the  helm  of  the  United  States, 


34 

it  has  since  appeared,  —  that  Mr.  Seward  had,  only  a  few  months 
previously,  desired  to  provoke  trouble  with  Great  Britain  with 
ulterior  purposes  in  view.  The  opportunity  for  so  doing  had 
now  presented  itself;  nor  was  there  any  reason  to  suppose 
that  the  views  of  the  Secretary  had  recently  undergone  change. 
Under  such  circumstances,  however,  it  was  perhaps  in  no  way 
so  remarkable,  nor  did  it  afford  just  ground  for  animadversion, 
that  the  din  of  preparation  for  war  in  the  one  country  was  con 
current  with  the  din  of  approval  of  the  seizure  in  the  other. 

Meanwhile  the  news  of  the  excitement  occasioned  throughout 
Great  Britain  by  Wilkes'  act  had  reached  America  on  the  i2th, 
six  days  before  the  arrival  of  Russell's  ultimatum.  The  dates 
necessary  to  bear  in  mind  are  therefore  the  1 6th  of  November, 

and  the  mob  and  the  Press  manning  the  vessel,  it  is  too  probable  that  this  atone 
ment  may  be  refused." 

To  the  same  effect,  William  H.  Russell  wrote  as  follows  to  the  Times:  — "In 
the  present  temper  of  the  American  people,  no  concessions  can  avert  serious 
complications  very  long,  or  the  surrender  of  all  the  boasted  privileges  of  the 
Civis  Romanus.  .  .  . 

"There  is  a  popular  passion  and  vengeance  to  be  gratified  by  the  capturing 
and  punishment  of  Mr.  Mason  and  Mr.  Slidell,  and  I  believe  the  Government 
will  retain  them  at  all  risks  because  it  dare  not  give  them  up,  not  being  strong 
enough  to  do  what  is  right,  in  the  face  of  popular  sentiment.  ...  I  was  much 
struck  with  the  deep  spirit  of  animosity  displayed  by  some  friends  of  mine,  for 
whom  I  entertain  a  great  respect,  in  speaking  of  the  probable  act  of  Great  Britain: 
—  '  If  we  are  forced  now  in  our  hour  of  weakness  to  give  up  Mason  and  Slidell,  I 
trust  to  God  that  every  man  in  America  will  make  a  solemn  resolve  to  let  England 
feel  the  force  of  our  resentment  and  an  undying  revenge  when  next  she  is  involved 
in  any  difficulty.'"  Letter  of  November  12,  printed  in  the  issue  of  the  Times 
for  December  3,  1861. 

"As  I  write  there  is  a  rumour  that  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  are  to  be  sur 
rendered.  If  it  be  true  this  Government  is  broken  up.  There  is  so  much  violence 
of  spirit  among  the  lower  orders  of  the  people,  and  they  are  so  ignorant  of  every 
thing  except  their  own  politics  and  passions,  so  saturated  with  pride  and  vanity 
that  any  honorable  concession  even  in  this  hour  of  extremity  would  prove  fatal 
to  its  authors."  From  letter  dated  November  25,  in  the  issue  of  the  Times  of 
December  10,  1861. 

The  general  understanding  and  accepted  popular  conviction  in  Great  Britain 
was  thus  set  forth  in  an  editorial  in  the  Illustrated  London  News  of  December  14, 
1861:  "While  it  is  broadly  stated  on  all  hands  on  this  side  of  the  water  that  a 
restoration  of  the  old  Union  is  assuming  the  aspect  of  an  impossibility,  it  has 
been  whispered  that  such  an  opinion  has  secretly  taken  root  in  the  minds  of  the 
Cabinet  at  Washington,  and  that  a  contest  with  England  is  adopted  as  a  policy 
out  of  which  may  spring  a  pretext  for  the  ultimate  acknowledgment  of  the  inde 
pendence  of  the  South.  If  this  is  really  the  case,  why,  all  ground  for  argument 
is  cut  away,  and  it  must  be  readily  admitted  that  no  course  more  calculated  to 
attain  that  end  could  have  been  selected  than  that  of  bringing  on  a  quarrel  with 
this  country." 


35 

when  the  news  of  the  seizure  reached  America;  the  2yth,  when 
the  same  news  reached  Europe;  the  i2th  of  December,  when 
the  extreme  seriousness  of  the  situation  first  dawned  on  the 
American  mind  through  tidings  of  the  British  excitement  and 
consequent  demands;  and,  finally,  the  i8th  of  December,  when 
it  became  apparent  that  a  decision  as  to  the  course  to  be  by  it 
pursued  had  to  be  reached  within  one  week  by  the  American 
Government.  Thus,  between  the  date  of  the  arrival  of  the 
San  Jacinto  at  Hampton  Roads  (November  15),  and  the 
announcement  from  Washington  that  the  envoys  would  be 
surrendered  (December  26)  forty  days  elapsed.  This  was  a 
most  important  factor;  for,  as  the  result  showed,  during  that 
period  the  popular  effervescence  had  time  in  which  to  subside, 
while  by  the  forty-first  day  the  sober  second  thought  might 
to  a  degree  be  invoked  with  some  assurance  of  a  response. 
An  Anglo-Saxon  community  rarely  goes  daft  permanently. 

It  was  so  in  this  case;  and,  though  both  in  public  and  pri 
vate,  some,  like  Hale  of  New  Hampshire  and  Lovejoy  of  Illi 
nois  in  Congress,  and  two  of  the  sons  of  Mr.  Adams  in  private 
correspondence,  foamed  at  the  mouth,  swearing  inextinguish 
able  hatred  of  Great  Britain  and  asseverating  an  unalterable 
determination  to  bide  their  time  for  revenge  on  that  arrogant 
and  overbearing  nationality,1  so  far  as  the  great  body  of  public 

1  The  absurdities  and  excesses  of  speech  into  which  the  prevailing  epidemic 
of  excitement  led  people  at  this  juncture  seem  now  simply  incredible.  For  in 
stance,  one  gentleman  rushed  into  print  proposing  as  a  remedy  for  existing  con 
ditions  that  Mason  and  Slidell  should  at  once  be  tried,  convicted  of  treason, 
sentenced,  and  hanged,  —  this  before  Great  Britain  could  formulate  demands  for 
their  surrender.  The  whole  difficulty,  he  claimed,  would  thus  be  disposed  of. 

The  favorite  formula,  however,  seems  to  have  been  of  a  Hamilcarian  character, 
—  that  is,  the  swearing  of  one's  offspring  to  eternal  hatred.  Of  this  there  were 
many  cases;  for  example,  Mr.  Lovejoy,  a  member  of  Congress,  of  Illinois,  thus 
expressed  himself  on  the  floor  of  the  House  of  Representatives  on  the  afternoon 
of  January  7,  when  the  correspondence  between  Secretary  Seward  and  the  British 
Government,  relative  to  the  Trent  case,  were  laid  before  the  House:  "I  am  made 
to  renew  the  horrible  grief  which  I  suffered  when  the  news  of  the  surrender  of 
Mason  and  Slidell  came.  I  acknowledge  it,  I  literally  wept  tears  of  vexation. 
I  hate  it;  and  I  hate  the  British  government.  I  have  never  shared  in  the  tradi 
tional  hostility  of  many  of  my  countrymen  against  England.  But  I  now  here 
publicly  avow  and  record  my  inextinguishable  hatred  of  that  government.  I 
mean  to  cherish  it  while  I  live,  and  to  bequeath  it  as  a  legacy  to  my  children 
when  I  die.  And  if  I  am  alive  when  war  with  England  comes,  as  sooner  or  later 
it  must,  for  we  shall  never  forget  this  humiliation,  and  if  I  can  carry  a  musket  in 
that  war  I  will  carry  it.  I  have  three  sons,  and  I  mean  to  charge  them,  and  do 


36 

opinion  was  concerned  the  insanity  passed  away  almost  as 
suddenly  as  it  had  asserted  itself.  Reason  resumed  its  sway. 

And  yet,  while  this  greatly  to  the  credit  of  the  American 
people  proved  in  the  outcome  to  be  the  case,  at  the  time  such 
grave  doubt  was  felt  as  to  the  popular  reception  of  the  decision 
to  surrender  the  envoys  that  they  were  actually  smuggled  out 
of  Boston  harbor,  Province  town  being  selected  as  the  point  of 
delivery  to  a  British  frigate.  This  was  suggested  by  Mr.  Seward 
to  Lord  Lyons  as  the  better  course,  the  Secretary  being  "ap 
prehensive  that  some  outrage  would  be  offered  by  the  populace 
to  the  prisoners  and  the  British  flag."  No  sufficient  grounds 
in  reality  existed  for  any  such  apprehension,  but  at  the  same 
time  a  reliable  correspondent  wrote  from  Boston  to  Charles 
Sumner  that  "the  whole  population  were  terribly  excited, 
ready  to  plan  any  kind  of  an  expedition  to  sink  the  vessel  that 
should  be  sent  to  convey  the  Rebels  from  Fort  Warren."  1  So 
general  was  this  belief  that  Russell,  the  Times  correspondent, 
then  at  Washington  and  in  very  direct  daily  communication 
with  the  best  informed  authorities,  "resolved  to  go  to  Boston 
being  satisfied  that  a  great  popular  excitement  and  uprising 
will,  in  all  probability,  take  place."  2  The  delivery  did  not, 
however,  in  fact,  occasion  a  ripple  of  lawlessness. 

Such  being  the  facts  of  the  "affair"  and  the  dates  of  the 
occurrences  in  its  development,  it  is  of  interest  now,  and  cer 
tainly  not  without  its  value  as  matter  of  experience,  to  con 
sider  the  courses  then  possible  to  have  been  pursued  by  the 
United  States  and  to  contrast  them,  coolly  and  reflectively, 
with  that  which  was  actually  pursued.  And  in  so  doing  the 

now  publicly  and  solemnly  charge  them,  that  if  they  shall  have  at  that  time 
reached  the  years  of  manhood  and  strength,  they  shall  enter  into  that  war." 

To  the  same  effect  Captain  Dahlgren,  of  the  navy,  vowed  to  Mr.  Russell  that 
if  England  should  avail  herself  "of  the  temporary  weakness  of  the  United  States 
to  get  back  the  rebel  commissioners  by  threats  or  force,  every  American  should 
make  his  son  swear  eternal  hostility  to  Great  Britain." 

Finally,  one  of  Mr.  Adams'  sons,  writing  to  his  father,  expressed  himself  in 
the  same  vein,  as  follows:  —  "I  at  least  would  care  to  impress  but  one  thing  on  a 
son  of  mine,  and  that  should  be  inveterate,  undying,  immortal  hatred  of  Great 
Britain.  In  this  I  do  not  feel  that  I  am  at  all  exaggerating  the  general  feeling 
here."  He  wrote  December  30,  1861. 

A  curious  collection  might  be  made  of  utterances  of  the  same  import  at  that 
juncture. 

1  Works,  VHI.  102. 

2  Russell,  My  Diary,  n.  428-429. 


37 

thought  which  first  suggests  itself  is  one  not  conducive  in  us 
to  an  increased  sense  of  national  pride.  What  an  opportunity 
was  then  lost!  How  completely  our  public  men,  and  through 
them  our  community,  failed  to  rise  to  the  height  of  the  occasion ! 
For,  viewed  in  the  perspective  of  history,  it  is  curious,  and  for 
an  American  of  that  period  almost  exasperating,  to  reflect 
upon  what  a  magnificent  move  in  the  critical  game  then  con 
ducted  would  have  been  made  had  the  advice  of  Montgomery 
Blair  been  followed  to  the  letter  and  in  spirit.  To  carry  out 
the  simile,  by  such  a  playing  of  the  pieces  on  the  board  as  he 
suggested,  how  effectually  a  checkmate  would  have  been 
administered  to  the  game  of  both  the  Confederates  and  their 
European  sympathizers!  In  the  first  place,  the  act  of  Wilkes, 
as  was  subsequently  and  on  better  reflection  universally  con 
ceded,  was  ill-considered,  improper,  and  in  violation  of  all 
correct  naval  usage.  It  should  have  been  rebuked  accord 
ingly,  and  officers  should  have  been  taught  by  example  and 
at  the  commencement  that  they  were  neither  diplomatic 
representatives  nor  judicial  tribunals  administering  admiralty 
law.  It  was  for  them  to  receive  instructions  and  implicitly  to 
obey  them.  A  reprimand  of  much  the  same  nature  was  at  almost 
this  very  time  administered  to  General  John  C.  Fremont,  when 
in  Missouri  he  undertook  by  virtue  of  martial  law  to  proclaim 
the  freedom  of  the  slave  throughout  the  military  department 
under  his  command.  His  ill-considered  order  was  revoked; 
and  he  was  officially  instructed  that  he  was  to  confine  himself 
to  his  military  functions,  and  that  the  administration  reserved 
to  itself  all  action  of  a  political  character.  So  much  for  Captain 
Wilkes,  and  the  reprimand  he  should  have  received  because  of 
his  indiscreet  and  unauthorized  proceeding. 

Next,  such  a  line  of  conduct  would  have  been  on  the  part  of 
the  Government  in  severe  and  manly  adherence  to  the  past 
contentions  of  the  United  States.  It  would  have  recognized  in 
the  action  taken  by  Wilkes  an  attempt  to  carry  the  right  of 
search  and  power  of  impressment  far  beyond  any  precedent 
ever  established  by  the  British  Government,  even  in  the  days 
of  its  greatest  maritime  ascendency,  and  consequent  arrogance. 
In  the  strong  and  contemptuous  language  of  Mr.  Adams, 
America,  in  sustaining  Wilkes,  was  consenting  "to  take  up  and 
to  wear  [Britain's]  cast-off  rags."  If,  instead  of  so  bedizening 


38 

itself,  the  United  States  had  boldly,  defiantly,  and  at  once  now 
adhered  to  its  former  contentions,  its  attitude  would  have 
been  simply  magnificent;  and,  as  such,  it  would  have  com 
manded  respect  and  admiration. 

Nor  was  this  aspect  of  the  situation  wholly  unseen  by  some 
at  the  time;  for,  writing  from  his  post  in  London  to  J.  L.  Motley 
in  Vienna  on  the  4th  of  December,  1861,  the  date  at  which 
the  tension  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  was 
at  the  breaking  point,  Mr.  Adams  thus  expressed  himself:  "It 
ought  to  be  remembered  that  the  uniform  tendency  of  our  own 
policy  has  been  to  set  up  very  high  the  doctrine  of  neutral 
rights,  and  to  limit  in  every  possible  manner  the  odious  doctrine 
of  search.  To  have  the  two  countries  virtually  changing  their 
ground  under  this  momentary  temptation  would  not,  as  it 
seems  to  me,  tend  to  benefit  the  position  of  the  United  States.1 
Whereas,  a  contrary  policy  might  be  made  the  means  of  secur 
ing  a  great  concession  of  principle  from  Great  Britain.  Whether 
the  government  at  home  will  remain  cool  enough  to  see  its 
opportunity,  I  have  no  means  of  judging.'7  And  a  few  days 
later  —  December  7,  1861 — John  Bright,  writing  to  Charles 
Sumner,  expressed  himself  to  the  same  effect:  "You  may  dis 
appoint  your  enemies  by  the  moderation  and  reasonableness  of 
your  conduct,  and  every  honest  and  good  man  in  England  will 
applaud  your  wisdom.  Put  all  the  fire-eaters  in  the  wrong, 
and  Europe  will  admire  the  sagacity  of  your  Government." 
"Sagacity  of  your  Government!"  That  phrase  expressed  ex 
actly  what  the  situation  called  for,  and  got  only  in  a  very  mod 
ified  degree. 

Taken  immediately  and  openly  in  the  presence  of  the  whole 
world,  the  position  advised  by  Blair  would  have  indicated  the 
supreme  confidence  we  felt  in  our  national  power,  and  the  pro- 

1  The  timidity  and  hesitation  with  which  Americans  then  advanced,  for  it 
cannot  be  said  they  really  advocated,  the  traditional  American  policy,  are  fairly 
matter  of  surprise.  For  instance,  in  a  letter  to  the  London  Times,  printed  in  its 
issue  of  December  14,  —  a  letter  which  Mr.  Adams  criticised  at  the  time  as 
being  "a  little  too  smooth  and  deprecating," — Mr.  Thurlow  Weed  thus  cautiously 
referred  to  the  law  as  laid  down  by  Lord  Stowell:  "Were  I  at  all  qualified  to  enter 
into  the  legal  argument  I  should  be  inclined  to  accept  your  view  of  the  question, 
to  wit,  that  time  and  circumstances  have  so  far  changed  the  practice,  reformed 
the  principles  of  international  maritime  law  as  to  render  the  earlier  precedents 
and  authorities  largely  inapplicable  to  existing  cases."  Memoir  of  Thurlow  Weed, 
n.  354- 


39 

nounced  contempt  in  which  we  held  both  those  whom  we  called 
"rebels"  and  those  whom  they  termed  their  " envoys."  If 
reached  and  publicly  announced  after  mature  deliberation 
during  the  week  which  followed  the  announcement  of  the 
seizure  from  Fortress  Monroe  (November  23),  as  trans-Atlantic 
communication  was  conducted  in  those  days  the  news  would 
scarcely  have  reached  England  before  the  3d  of  December, 
just  three  days  after  the  peremptory  and  somewhat  offensive 
despatch  of  Earl  Russell  demanding  the  immediate  surrender 
of  the  arrested  envoys  was  beyond  recall  or  modification,  well 
on  its  way  to  America.  A  situation  would  have  resulted 
almost  ludicrous  so  far  as  Great  Britain  was  concerned,  but, 
for  the  United  States,  most  consistent,  dignified  and  im 
posing.  Excited,  angry,  arrogant,  bent  on  reparation  or 
war,  Great  Britain  would  have*  been  let  down  suddenly, 
and  very  hard  and  flat.  Its  posture  would,  to  say  the  least, 
have  been  the  reverse  of  impressive.  But  for  us  it  would 
have  established  our  prestige  in  the  eyes  of  foreign  nations, 
and  once  for  all  silenced  the  numerous  emissaries  who  were 
sedulously  working  in  every  part  of  Europe  to  bring  about  our 
undoing  through  foreign  interference.  In  particular,  the 
immediate  delivery  of  the  envoys,  in  advance  of  any  demand 
therefor  and  on  the  very  ship  which  had  undertaken  to  exer 
cise  the  right  of  search  and  seizure  under  the  command  of  the 
officer  who  had  thus  exceeded  his  authority  and  functions, 
would,  so  to  speak,  have  put  the  Government  of  Great  Britain 
thenceforth  under  bonds,  so  far  as  the  United  States  was 
concerned.  Thereafter  any  effort,  either  of  the  "envoys" 
thus  contemptuously  surrendered  or  of  other  Confederate 
emissaries,  would,  so  far  as  this  country  was  concerned,  have 
been  futile.  Reciprocity  would  from  that  moment  have  been 
in  order,  and  all  question  of  foreign  recognition  would  have 
ceased.  The  whole  course  of  international  events  in  the  imme 
diate  future  would  probably  have  been  far  different  from  what 
it  was;  for  with  what  measure  we  had  used,  it  would  neces 
sarily  have  been  measured  to  us  again. 

Such  a  line  of  conduct  immediately  decided  on  and  boldly 
declared  would  have  been  an  inspiration  worthy  of  a  Cavour 
or  a  Bismarck;  but,  though  actually  urged  in  the  Cabinet 
meetings  by  Montgomery  Blair,  its  adoption  called  for  a  grasp 


40 

of  the  situation  and  a  quickness  of  decision  which,  very  pos 
sibly,  could  not  reasonably  be  expected  under  conditions  then 
existing.  It  also  may  even  yet  be  urged  that,  if  then  taken  and 
announced,  such  a  policy  would  have  failed  to  command  the 
assent  of  an  excited  public  opinion.  That  it  would  have  failed 
to  do  so  is,  however,  open  to  question;  for  it  is  more  than 
possible,  it  is  even  probable,  that  American  intelligence  would 
even  then  have  risen  at  once  to  the  international  possibilities 
presented,  and  in  that  crisis  of  stress  and  anxiety  would  have 
measured  the  extent  to  which  the  "affair"  could  be  improved 
to  the  public  advantage.  The  national  vanity  would  unques 
tionably  have  been  flattered  by  an  adherence  so  consistent 
and  sacrificing  to  the  contentions  and  policies  of  the  past. 
The  memories  of  1812  would  have  revived.  However,  admit 
ting  that  a  policy  of  this  character,  now  obviously  that  which 
should  have  been  pursued',  was  under  practical  and  popular 
conditions  then  prevailing  at  least  inadvisable,  it  remains  to 
consider  yet  another  alternative. 

Assuming  that  the  course  pursued  remained  unchanged  an 
entire  month  after  the  seizure,  and  up  to  the  i2th  of  December, 
when  the  news  arrived  in  America  of  the  excitement  occasioned 
by  the  seizure  in  Great  Britain  and  the  extreme  seriousness 
of  the  situation  resulting  therefrom,  —  assuming  this,  it  is 
now  obvious  that  the  proper  policy  then  and  under  such  con 
ditions  to  have  been  adopted,  although  it  could  not  have 
produced  the  results  which  would  have  been  produced  by  the 
policy  just  considered  if  adopted  and  announced  ten  days 
earlier,  would  still  have  been  consistent  and  dignified,  and,  as 
such,  would  have  commanded  general  respect.  It  was  very 
clearly  outlined  by  Mr.  Adams  in  a  letter  written  to  Cassius 
M.  Clay,  then  the  representative  of  the  country  at  St.  Peters 
burg,  in  the  following  month.  He  expressed  himself  as  follows : 
—  "Whatever  opinion  I  may  have  of  the  consistency  of  Great 
Britain,  or  of  the  temper  in  which  she  has  prosecuted  her 
latest  convictions,  that  does  not  in  my  judgment  weigh  a 
feather  in  the  balance  against  the  settled  policy  of  the  United 
States  which  has  uniformly  condemned  every  and  any  act 
like  that  of  Captain  Wilkes  when  authorized  by  other  nations. 
The  extension  of  the  rights  of  neutrals  on  the  ocean  and  the 
protection  of  them  against  the  arbitrary  exercise  of  mere 


power  have  been  cardinal  principles  in  the  system  of  American 
statesmen  ever  since  the  foundation  of  the  Government.  It 
is  not  for  us  to  abandon  them  under  the  transient  impulse 
given  by  the  capture  of  a  couple  of  unworthy  traitors.  What 
are  they  that  a  country  like  ours  should  swerve  one  hair  from 
the  line  of  its  ancient  policy,  merely  for  the  satisfaction  of 
punishing  them?  " 

If  the  advisers  of  Mr.  Lincoln  had  viewed  the  situation  in 
this  light,  when  his  Secretary  of  State  sat  down  to  prepare 
his  answer  to  the  English  demand  he  would  at  once  with  a 
bold  sweep  of  the  hand  have  dismissed  as  rubbish  the  English 
precedents  and  authorities,  reverting  to  the  attitude  and  con 
tentions  uniformly  and  consistently  held  by  the  Government 
for  which  he  spoke,  during  the  earlier  years  of  the  century. 
The  proceeding  of  Captain  Wilkes  would  then  have  been  pro 
nounced  inconsistent  with  the  traditions  and  established  policy 
of  the  United  States,  and  the  line  of  action  by  it  to  be  pursued 
in  the  case  immediately  presented  would  have  been  dictated 
thereby.  The  course  to  be  pursued  on  the  issue  raised  was 
clear,  and  the  surrender  of  the  envoys  must  be  ordered  accord 
ingly;  —  and  this  in  no  degree  because  of  their  small  impor 
tance,  as  suggested  by  Lord  Palmers  ton  in  his  talk  with  Mr. 
Adams  —  though  unquestionably  the  fact  would  have  secretly 
exercised  no  little  influence  on  the  mind  of  the  Secretary  — 
and  still  less  was  it  ordered  because  of  any  failure  of  Captain 
Wilkes  to  seize  the  Trent  as  prize  on  the  ground  of  alleged 
breach  of  neutrality:  but  exclusively  for  the  reason  that  the 
seizure  in  question  was  unauthorized,  in  direct  disregard  of 
the  established  policy  of  the  United  States  and  its  contentions 
in  regard  to  the  rights  of  neutrals,  clearly  and  repeatedly 
set  forth  in  many  previous  controversies  with  the  Government 
represented  by  Earl  Russell.  From  that  policy,  to  quote  the 
language  of  Mr.  Adams,  "this  country  was  not  disposed  to 
swerve  by  a  single  hair's  breadth."  In  accordance  with  it, 
delivery  of  the  so-called  "envoys"  was  ordered. 

Again,  an  opportunity  was  lost!  Such  an  attitude  would 
have  been  dignified,  consistent  and  statesmanlike.  It  would 
have  had  in  it  no  element  of  adroitness  and  no  appearance 
of  special  pleading.  It  could  hardly  have  failed  immediately 
to  commend  itself  to  the  good  judgment  as  well  as  pride  of 


42 

the  American  people,  and  it  would  certainly  have  commanded 
the  respect  of  foreign  nations. 

Of  the  elaborate,  and  in  many  respects  memorable,  despatch 
addressed  by  Secretary  Seward  to  Lord  Lyons,  in  answer  to 
the  categorical  demand  for  the  immediate  release  of  the  two 
envoys,1  it  is  not  necessary  here  to  speak  in  detail.  It  is  his 
torical,  and  my  paper  has  already  extended  far  beyond  the 
limits  originally  proposed.  Of  this  state  paper  I  will  therefore 
merely  say  that,  reading  it  now,  "clever,"  not  "great,"  is  the 
term  which  suggests  itself  as  best  descriptive.  Much  commended 
at  the  time,  it  has  not  stood  the  test.2  In  composing  it,  the 

1  In  his  official  despatch  conceding  the  surrender  of  the  envoys,  Mr.  Seward 
observed  that  the  British  claim  for  reparation  was  not  made  "in  a  discourteous 
manner."     A  later  writer,  however,  has  referred  to  the  "indecent  haste  and 
manifest  unfairness  of  the  whole  proceeding,  as  well  as  the  bombast  and  implied 
threats"  contained  in  Lord  Russell's  letters  to  Lord  Lyons.    Without  going  into 
details  on  this  subject,  it  may  however  be  observed  that,  so  far  as  the  United 
States  is  concerned,  the  despatch  in  question,  as  respects  either  language  or  per- 
emptoriness  of  tone,  would  compare  not  unfavorably  with  the  subsequent  atti 
tude  and  utterances  of  our  spokesmen  in  the  case  of  the  difficulty  of  this  country 
with  Chili,  as  set  forth  in  President  Harrison's  message  of  January  12, 1892,  anent 
the  assault  on  American  sailors  in  Valparaiso;  or  with  those  of  President  Cleve 
land  as  embodied  in  the  memorable  Venezuela  message  directed  at  Great  Britain, 
December  17,  1895;  or  with  those  of  President  McKinley  in  his  message  of  April 
n,  1898,  communicating  his  ultimatum  preceding  the  war  with  Spain;   or  with 
the  course  adopted  by  President  Roosevelt  in  February,  1904,  towards  the  United 
States  of  Colombia,  as  respects  the  independent  Republic  of  Panama,  proclaimed 
as  per  arrangement  the  day  previous  by  a  band  of  trembling  conspirators.    To 
the  record  in  all  these  cases  it  is  unnecessary  in  this  connection  more  particularly 
to  refer. 

2  A  far  harsher  criticism  must,  however,  be  passed  on  the  memorandum  of 
Secretary  Chase,  read  at  the  Cabinet  meeting  of  December  26,  1861,  and  printed 
in  Warden,  Private  Life  and  Public  Letters  of  Salmon  P.  Chase,  393,  394.    It  was 
distinctly  childish;   for  Mr.  Chase  then  said  of  Captain  Wilkes'  act:  — "How 
ever  excused  or  even  justified  by  motives,  the  act  of  removing  [Messrs.  Mason 
and  Slidell]  as  prisoners  from  the  Trent,  without  resort  to  any  judicial  cognizance, 
was  in  itself  indefensible.    We  could  not  deny  this  without  denying  our  history. 
Were  the  circumstances  reversed,  our  government  would,  Mr.  Chase  thought, 
accept  the  explanation,  and  let  England  keep  her  rebels;  and  he  could  not  divest 
himself  of  the  belief  that,  were  the  case  fairly  understood,  the  British  government 
would  do  likewise.  ...  It  is  gall  and  wormwood  to  me.    Rather  than  consent 
to  the  liberation  of  these  men,  I  would  sacrifice  everything  I  possess."    It  is 
hardly  necessary  to  observe  that  it  has  not  been  the  practice  of  either  Great 
Britain  or  the  United  States  to  yield  up  political  refugees,  or  "rebels"  asking 
right  of  asylum,  on  the  demand  of  any  Government  claiming  their  allegiance,  to 
"keep  her  rebels."    The  Koszta  case  is  here  distinctly  in  point.    Secretary  Chase 
appears  when  writing  this  memorandum  to  have  been  somewhat  oblivious  of  that 
precedent. 


43 

writer  plainly  had  his  eye  on  the  audience ;  while  his  ear,  so  to 
speak,  was  in  manifest  proximity  with  the  ground.  Indeed, 
his  vision  was  directed  to  so  many  different  quarters,  and  his 
ear  was  intent  on  such  a  confusion  of  rumblings  that  it  is  fair 
matter  for  surprise  that  he  acquitted  himself  even  as  success 
fully  as  he  did.  In  the  first  place,  it  was  necessary  for  him  to 
persuade  a  President  who  had  "  put  his  foot  down,"  and  whose 
wishes  inclined  to  a  quite  different  disposition  of  the  matter. 
In  the  next  place,  the  reluctant  members  of  a  divided  Cabinet 
were  to  be  conciliated  and  unified.  After  this,  Captain  Wilkes, 
the  naval  idol  of  the  day,  must  be  justified  and  supported. 
Then  Congress,  with  its  recent  commitments  as  respects  ap 
proval,  thanks,  gold  medals,  etc.,  had  to  be  not  only  pacified, 
but  reconciled  to  the  inevitable;  and,  finally,  an  aroused  and 
patriotic  public  opinion  was  to  be  soothed  and  gently  led  into 
a  lamb-like  acquiescence.  The  situation  in  the  aspect  it  then 
bore,  was,  it  cannot  be  denied,  both  complicated  and  delicate. 
Accordingly,  one  is  conscious,  in  reading  the  Secretary's  com 
munication  to  Lord  Lyons  of  December  26,  1861,  of  a  distinct 
absence  therein  of  both  grasp  and  elevation.  That  "bold  sweep 
of  the  hand  "  before  suggested,  is  conspicuous  for  its  absence. 
The  English  and  British  precedents  were  by  no  means  dis 
missed  as  antiquated  "  rubbish  ";  while,  on  the  contrary,  our 
own  earlier  and  better  contentions  were  silently  ignored.  In 
their  stead,  British  principles  were  adopted  as  sound  and  of 
established  authority;  and  thus  the  final  action  of  the  United 
States  in  delivering  the,  so  called,  envoys  was  rested  on  what 
the  Duke  of  Argyll  presently,  and  most  properly,  character 
ized  in  his  letter  to  Mr.  Adams  as  "  a  narrow  and  technical 
ground."  Captain  Wilkes,  it  was  argued,  while  acting  in 
strict  accordance  with  law  and  precedent,  had  failed  to  seize 
the  Trent  as  lawful  prize,  and  as  such,  send  her  into  an  Am 
erican  port  for  adjudication.  It  was  a  complete  abandon 
ment  of  the  traditional  American  contentions  in  favor  of  the 
arrogant  and  high-handed  policies  formerly  pursued  by  Great 
Britain,  but  now  by  her  silently  dismissed  as  antiquated  and 
inconvenient —  "  her  cast-off  rags  "  ! 

It  can,  therefore,  now  hardly  be  denied  that  there  was 
more  than  an  element  of  truth  in  the  criticisms  passed  upon 
the  Secretary's  momentous  reply  to  Lord  Russell's  demand 


44 

by  Hamilton  Fish,  in  a  letter  to  Charles  Sumner,  written  at  the 
time.  Mr.  Fish,  then  in  retirement,  not  impossibly  entertained 
feelings  of  a  nature  not  altogether  friendly  towards  Mr.  Seward, 
whose  colleague  he  had  been  in  the  Senate,  and  whom  later  he 
was  to  succeed  in  charge  of  the  Department  of  State.  They 
were  both  from  New  York,  and  had  been  contemporaneously 
active  in  New  York  politics.  Those  also  whose  attention  has 
been  called  to  the  grounds  of  comparison  will,  perhaps,  hardly 
be  disposed  to  deny  that  for  natural  grasp  of  the  spirit  and 
underlying  principles  of  international  law,  Hamilton  Fish  was 
better  endowed  than  either  Seward  or  Sumner.  Fish  now  wrote : 
-  "In  style  [the  letter]  is  verbose  and  egotistical;  in  argument, 
flimsy;  and  in  its  conception  and  general  scope  it  is  an  aban 
donment  of  the  high  position  we  have  occupied  as  a  nation  upon 
a  great  principle.  We  are  humbled  and  disgraced,  not  by  the 
act  of  the  surrender  of  four  of  our  own  citizens,  but  by  the 
manner  in  which  it  has  been  done,  and  the  absence  of  a  sound 
principle  upon  which  to  rest  and  justify  it.  ...  We  might  and 
should  have  turned  the  affair  vastly  to  our  credit  and  advan 
tage;  it  has  been  made  the  means  of  our  humiliation." 

The  ultimate  historical  verdict  must  apparently  be  in  accord 
ance  with  the  criticism  here  contemporaneously  expressed. 
The  Seward  letter  was  inadequate  to  the  occasion.  A  pos 
sible  move  of  unsurpassed  brilliancy  on  the  international 
chessboard  had,  almost  unseen,  been  permitted  to  escape  us. 


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DEC  I'  A** 


DUE  MAY  2  6  1969 


jCO 


JUN  1  2  REC'Q 


Book  Slip-13m-8,<57(C«107s4)45> 


PAMPHLET  BINDER 

:HH   Syracuse,  N.  Y. 
-—   Stockton.  Calif. 


IflKHQ 


Adams,  C.F. 

The  Trent  affair 


A3 


vri 


AS 


154030 


